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INTRODUCTION

The child welfare system suffers from a fundamental misorientation. The prevailing response to families at risk of abuse and neglect
is to wait for a crisis, then act. In many cases, the state intervenes only
after abuse or neglect has occurred. At that point, the state often
removes a child from her home and places her in foster care, which
can be rife with its own dangers. Once the child is out of the home,
the state takes largely ineffective steps to reunite the family. This post
hoc approach to child welfare has devastating effects for children, parents, and the state, By the time intervention occurs, children have
already been harmed. Parents have already succumbed to various ills,
such as substance abuse. And the state's interest in the stability of
families has been compromised, despite the system's twenty-two billion dollar annual price tag.'
These persistent problems could be largely avoided if the child
welfare system took prevention seriously. Targeted prevention programs as well as more broad based antipoverty programs have shown
1 See CYNTHIA ANDREWS SCARCELLA ET AL., THE URBAN INST., THE COST OF PROTECrING VULNERABLE CHILDREN IV, at 6 (2004), available at http://www.urban.org/

uploadedPDF/411115.VulnerableChildrenV.pdf.
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tremendous success in both preventing child abuse and neglect and
improving the well-being of families. 2 Despite this success, and
despite evidence demonstrating the long-term ill effects of child abuse
and neglect,3 such programs remain almost entirely at the margins of
4
child welfare policy.
The principal conceptual barrier to making prevention the centerpiece of child welfare is the dominant conception of family autonomy, which venerates freedom from state intervention. 5 This
"freedom from" conception fosters a legal and cultural environment
that encourages the state to leave families alone until the family
"fails."
I propose a conception of family autonomy that instead encourages "engagement with" the state. In the context of child welfare, this
engagement would take the form of targeted prevention programs
and general antipoverty efforts. Although some scholars have called
for this type of state support, 6 this Article provides a solid theoretical
grounding for such engagement.
In particular, my proposed conception of family autonomy builds
upon an understanding that families and the state are mutually
dependent. Families need the state, but the state also needs families.
The state's interest sounds both in notions of capacity building
(ensuring the next generation is prepared to participate in a deliberative democracy) and, more basically, in notions of societal stability
(ensuring the next generation is not an inordinate drain on state
resources).
Reconceiving family autonomy to encourage engagement with
the state, and basing this conception on mutual dependency is not,
2 See infra text accompanying notes 114-18.
3 See, e.g., Martin H. Teicher, Scars That Won't Heal The Neurobiology of Child
Abuse, Sci. AM., Mar. 2002, at 68, 70-75 (describing a study demonstrating that maltreatment during formative years can affect the development of the brain in ways that
cannot later be cured); Martin H. Teicher, Wounds That Time Won't Heal: The Neurobiology of Child Abuse, 2 CEREBRUM 50, 50-67 (2000) (same). There is also evidence that
children who are abused or neglected are more likely to commit violent crimes.
FIGHT CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS, NEw HOPE FOR PREVENTING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 2

(2003) [hereinafter FiGIrr CRIME: INVEST IN KIDS] (noting that current research indicates that, of the 900,000 substantiated cases of child abuse or neglect in one year, "an
additional 35,000 violent criminals and more than 250 murderers will emerge as
adults who would never have become violent criminals if not for the abuse and neglect they endured as children"), available at http://eric.gov/ERICDocs/data/eric
docs2/content storage O1/OOOOOOOb/80/23/51/61.pdf.
4 See infra notes 31, 48 and accompanying text.
5 See infra Part II.A-B.
6 See infra Part I.B.
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however, sufficient. A reconceived family autonomy must also address
the trenchant concern that state support of families inevitably leads to
state control of families, especially for low-income families. 7 Any
move away from the prevailing conception of family autonomy thus
involves a paradox: Families need state support to help avoid involvement in the child welfare system, but that support often undermines
familial self-determination.
The answer is decoupling a family's need for state support from a
family's interest in self-determination. Families need engagement
with the state, but this engagement should not, and indeed need not,
require a loss of familial self-determination. To ensure that state support fosters, and does not hinder, familial self-determination, the state
should not supplant its will and preferences for those of the family but
must instead incorporate an element of deference and respect in all
programs that aim to support families. After arguing that this is theoretically possible, I demonstrate that it is also possible in practice, as
exemplified by three innovative programs.
A reconceived family autonomy will have two far-reaching benefits. First, it will create a more effective child welfare system that actually serves the interests of children, parents, and the state by creating
an environment where a prevention-oriented approach to child welfare can take root. Second, it will further equality among families by
working toward equality of opportunity for families to engage in the
important work of self-determination.
With a more realistic and constructive conception of the role of
the state, policymakers could begin to view child welfare policy in a
more holistic manner-and not as an afterthought to the breakdown
of the family. But if the halting steps that we have begun to take in
this direction are to move from anomalies to prevailing practice, such
steps must have a conceptual undergirding. This Article provides that
structure.
Part I of this Article describes the current crisis in the child welfare system and the need for the prevention of child abuse and neglect. Part II argues that the current conception of family autonomy
poses a formidable barrier to the adoption of a prevention-oriented
approach to child welfare. This Part first describes the dominant conception of family autonomy and then argues that this conception has
a pernicious effect on the child welfare system. Part III proposes a
new conception of family autonomy. It first describes the importance
for families of engaging with the state rather than seeking freedom
from it. It then explores how such engagement need not come at the
7

See infra Part IH.C.
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price of familial self-determination. It continues by describing three
promising examples of a reconceived family autonomy-the NurseFamily Partnership program, the Chicago School District's Child-Parent Center, and reforms to the child welfare system in Alabama.
I.

THE FUNDAMENTAL MISORIENTATION

OF CHILD WELFARE

The child welfare system is in serious disrepair. Although the system is intended to protect children from abuse and neglect and to
keep families together, in too many cases state intervention helps
neither children nor parents. One of the principal failings of the system is that it spends too few resources on the prevention of child
abuse and neglect, choosing instead to intervene only after child
abuse and neglect has occurred or is imminent. This Part describes
both the problems with the current system and the need for
prevention.
A.

A Broken System

The child welfare system is designed to protect children believed
to be abused or neglected by their families and to strengthen families
where children are at imminent risk for abuse and neglect. 8 The state
offers "child protective services" 9 to families, ranging from providing
support to keep a family together to removing a child from her home
and placing her in a foster home or institution. This removal can lead
to the termination of parental rights and the adoption of the child.
There are approximately half a million children in foster care, a number that has grown dramatically over the past two decades.' 0 As I have
8 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (West Supp. 2006); MINN. STAT. § 626.556
(2006); N.J. STAT ANN. § 30:4C-1(a) (West Supp. 2006).
9 In this Article, I use the term "child welfare system" and "child protective services" interchangeably to refer to the entire system designed to respond to the abuse
and neglect of children.
10 The foster care population has risen from 302,000 in 1980 to 513,000 in 2005.
See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE AFCARS REPORT:
PRELIMINARY FY 2005 ESTIMATES AS OF SEPTEMBER 2006, at 1 (2006), availableat http://
www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats-research/afcars/tar/reportl 3.pdf; Richard
Wertheimer, Youth Who "Age Out" of Foster Care: Troubled Lives, Troubling Prospects,
CHILD TRENDs REs. BRIEF (Washington, D.C.), Dec. 2002, at 1, available at http://www.
childtrends.org/Files/FosterCareRB.pdf. In 2004, child welfare agencies across the
country investigated an estimated 3.5 million reports of alleged child maltreatment
and substantiated 872,000 of these reports. See CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUAN SERVS., CHILD MALTR.ATMENT 2004, at 23 (2006), available at http:/
/www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/pubs/cmO4/cmO4pdf. Not all of the substantiated
cases result in removal; in some instances, the family is provided services while the
children remain in the home. See id. at 84. Neglect is by far the most prevalent form
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detailed elsewhere, this system simply does not serve the interests of
parents, children, or the state." Here, I will briefly describe three
12
dimensions of the system's extreme shortcomings.
First, the state does not resolve the underlying problems facing
families in the child welfare system. Instead, the prevailing response
to child abuse and neglect is to remove children from their homes
and place them in foster care. 13 Once in foster care, the state does
little to reunite families, often providing "treatment" to parents that
consists of little more than boilerplate plans.1 4 Further, the state allocates scant resources for such treatment, virtually ensuring that parents will not succeed.1 5 Additionally, the system is self-perpetuating.
Research has begun to show the intergenerational cycle of foster care.
Many parents of children in foster care today were once in foster care
themselves.1 6 The system does not address this cyclical nature of
abuse and neglect. For example, the state invests too little in mental
health programs that would enable victims to heal their own trauma
and help prevent the cycle from repeating.
of maltreatment (62.4% of cases), with physical abuse a distant second (17.5%), and
sexual abuse surfacing in about one in ten cases (9.7%). Id. at 24.
11 See Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REV. 637,
655-72 (2006).
12 In critiquing the child welfare system, I do not intend to perpetuate, as Marsha
Garrison so well describes, "a simplistic, anti-authoritarian ideology that cast[s] the
state child welfare system as villain and the families served by that system as victims."
Marsha Garrison, Reforming Child Protection:A Public Health Perspective, 12 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 590, 595 (2005); accord Daniel Bergner, The Case of Marie and Her Sons, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 28, 31-32 (profiling the care and thought of
child welfare workers). Although there is certainly evidence to support this narrative,
my point is that the state's interaction with families would be far more effective if
reoriented along the lines I suggest.
13 See Huntington, supra note 11, at 693 (discussing work of Duncan Lindsey and
his argument that the current child welfare system takes a "residual" approach to
abuse and neglect).

14 See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS 79 (2002); Annette R. Appell,
Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection
System, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 583 (1997).
15

See ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 89-91.

16

See, e.g., NAN P. ROMAN & PHYLLIS WOLFE, NAT'L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESS-

NESS, WEB OF FAILURE:

THE

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOSTER CARE AND HOMELESSNESS 9

(1995),
http://www.endhomelessness.org/content/article/detail/1285/
(finding
that, in a nationwide survey of homeless families in shelters, seventy-seven percent of
those parents who had once been in foster care had at least one child who was or had
been in foster care, as compared to twenty-seven percent of parents in the shelters
that did not have such a history). For an anecdotal account of the intergenerational
cycle, see NINA BERNSTEIN, THE LOST CHILDREN OF WILDER (2001).
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The failure to focus on the underlying problems is particularly
egregious in cases of poverty-related neglect, where arguably the provision of services would be more effective than removal of children
from the home. Research has demonstrated that the major determinant of children's removal from their parents' custody is not the severity of the abuse or neglect but, rather, unstable sources of parental
income.1 7 Poverty-related neglect cases-which constitute approximately fifty percent of all casest 8-typically involve substance abuse,
inadequate housing, or inappropriate child care arrangements. 19
Although substance abuse is a serious problem and may well present a
substantial threat to the well-being of a child, the child welfare system
can and should respond to poverty-related neglect in a different manner from the ten percent of cases where the abuse and neglect is so
20
severe it warrants criminal proceedings.
Second, the removal of children from their homes-so-called
"child protection"-comes at a great cost to children. To be sure, in
cases of extreme abuse and neglect, removal may well be necessary
because of the danger in the home. But for the remaining cases,
although some intervention may be needed, removing the child and
placing her in foster care comes at a high cost. In addition to the
(even temporary) loss of their families, children often languish in fos17 See DUNCAN LINDsEY, THE WELFAR OF CHILDREN 168-69 (2d ed. 2004); Huntington, supra note 11, at 666-70 (discussing the correlation between poverty and
involvement in the child welfare system). Moreover, these removals are not spread
evenly across race lines and instead are concentrated among African-Americans. See
id. at 656-58 (discussing statistics concerning racial disparities in the child welfare
system as well as the argument that poverty, not racial bias, accounts for the differential rates of involvement); see also id. at 657-58 (discussing political and geographic
influences on removal of children).
18 SeeJANE WALDFOCEL, THE FUTURE OF CHILD PROTECrION 125 (1998).
19 See Huntington, supra note 11, at 666-68 (describing studies documenting this
aspect of the child welfare system).
20 See Douglas J. Besharov & Lisa A. Laumann, Don't Call It Child Abuse If It's Really
Poverty, 3J. CHILD. & PovFRTi 5, 24-29 (1997) (proposing that the state provide longterm, supportive services to families where the children are suffering from povertyrelated neglect, rather than placing the children in the child welfare system). Further, although media reports profiling cases of extreme abuse or neglect abound,
such cases are the exception. Indeed, the best estimates are that only ten percent of
all the cases in the child welfare system involve abuse and neglect serious enough to
warrant criminal charges. SeeWALDFOGEL, supra note 18, at 124-25. The remaining
forty percent fall somewhere in between, involving abuse or neglect that does not
require intervention by the criminal justice system but still rises above the level of
poverty-related neglect. Id. Although these categories are not perspicuous, distinctions among cases can be made and it is clear that only a small percentage of cases fall
into the severe category.
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ter care for months and even years, moving from one home to
another.2 ' Furthermore, while in foster care, children are at a height22
ened risk for additional abuse or neglect, especially sexual abuse.
And even if eventually reunified with a parent, children who were
once in foster care typically suffer significant economic, educational,
23
and psychological hardship.
Finally, this system is exceptionally expensive for the state. Federal, state, and local governments spend twenty-two billion dollars per
year on the child welfare system. 24 The indirect monetary costs are
even higher. 25 And the nonmonetary harm, although difficult to calculate, is undeniably substantial. 26 As I detail below, despite the hefty
price tag, the system does not further the state's interest in building
the capacity of children or in preparing them to be contributing
27
members of society.
B.

The Need for Prevention

These problems of the child welfare system are well known and
proposals for change abound. For example, I have proposed a problem-solving model of child welfare to take the place of the current
21 See Huntington, supra note 11, at 660 (describing average lengths of stay and
multiple placements in foster care, even despite 1997 legislation intended to address
these problems).
22 Id. at 662 (describing increased risk in foster care of physical abuse, medical
neglect, and especially sexual abuse).
23 See id. at 661 & n.123, 662 (detailing these outcomes, including, for example,
the fact that sixty percent of young women who "age out" of foster care were pregnant
or already parenting within twelve to eighteen months after leaving the foster care
system (citing Ronna J. Cook, Are We Helping Foster Care Youth Preparefor Their Future?,
16 CHILD & YOUTH SERVS. REv. 213, 222 (1994))).
24 See ScARcELLA ET A.., supra note 1, at 6.
25 By one estimate, the indirect costs of the child welfare system amount to an
additional ninety-four billion dollars. SuZEI-rE FROMM, TOTAL ESTIMATED COST OF
CHILD ABUSE AND NEcLECT IN THE UNITED STATES (2001), available at http://www.
preventchildabusenj.org/documents/index/cost-analysis.pdf (estimating costs of
physical and mental health problems, juvenile delinquency, adult criminality, special
education needs, and lost productivity).
26 As Maxine Eichner argues:
Even more important are the vast non-financial costs to the polity from having hundreds of thousands of its most vulnerable citizens, each of whom
should be developing their capabilities to become vigorous and active citizens and productive members of society, become physically, mentally, and
emotionally damaged, many of them for life, by the current system.
Maxine Eichner, Children, Parents, and the State: Re-Thinking Foster Care Relationships, 12
VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 448, 459 (2005).
27 See infra Part III.A.2-3.
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rights-based model. 28 In that model, the state would seek to address
the underlying causes of child abuse and neglect, thus attempting to
solve the problems of the families in the system, rather than fruitlessly
29
calibrating the rights of parent and child.
A truly effective child welfare system, however, would seek to prevent child abuse and neglect, thus limiting the number of families who
enter the system.3 0 As currently oriented, the child welfare system
does far too little to prevent child abuse and neglect and instead
works predominantly with families who have already abused or
31
neglected their children or where abuse or neglect is imminent
28
29

See Huntington, supra note 11, at 672-74.
See id. at 687-95. There have also been other proposals for reforming the

child welfare system, most notably a report published in 2004 by the Pew Commission

on Children in Foster Care. See

PEW COMM'N ON CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE, FOSTER-

FUTURE 16-18 (2004). The Commission made numerous recommendations,
including financial reforms that would increase flexibility in how federal funds are
allocated, federal assistance to adoptive families and guardians, improved data collection to ensure the efficient use of resources and increase public accountability, and
funding of further research. Id. The Commission also made recommendations
aimed toward strengthening the court system, including court performance measures,
outcome data collection, increased federal funding, a direct voice for parents and
children in the court room, effective representation, and leadership by state chief
justices to ensure the competency and training of those involved in proceedings. Id.
30 There is an active debate about when the state should intervene in cases of
suspected abuse and neglect. See, e.g., Douglas J. Besharov, Child Abuse Realities: OverReporting and Poverty, 8 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 165, 200-01 (2000) (arguing that state
intervention is over-inclusive and the child welfare system should not include povertyrelated cases; in these cases, "society would do better if it did nothing.., rather than
the wrong-and often harmful-something"); Margaret F. Brinig, Choosing the Lesser
Evil: Comment on Besharov's "ChildAbuse Realities",8 VA.J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 205, 209-18
(2000) (responding to Professor Besharov by arguing that the state should err on the
side of over-inclusion, and further noting that it is possible to predict more accurately
which parents will abuse or neglect their children and thus use this prediction to
narrow the intervention net). When the state should intervene is an important question, but, in this Article, I focus on preventing abuse and neglect altogether, not
where to draw the line in marginal cases.
31 See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 181-85
(2005) (discussing the origins of child protection as part of the attempt to address
child poverty, but describing political changes in the twentieth century, particularly
the 1970s, that led away from framing child abuse as a product of greater social ills);
LINDSEY, supra note 17, at 177-78 (describing the "residual" nature of child welfare
system); VIOLENCE IN FAMILIES 15 (Rosemary Chalk & Patricia King eds., 1998). Federal laws governing the disbursement of child welfare funds reinforce this model.
States receive substantially more funds for the placement of children in foster care
and adoptive homes than for the prevention of child abuse and neglect. For example, in 2002, for every federal dollar spent on the prevention of child abuse and neglect, nine federal dollars were spent on foster care and an additional three federal
dollars on adoption. See SCARCELLA ET AL., supra note 1, at 16, 19, 21, 23-24.
ING THE
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Numerous scholars have called for preventive approaches to
child welfare, although the prescriptions vary somewhat. For example, Dorothy Roberts has argued in favor of programs that target poverty. Professor Roberts contends that
[t]he ingredients for a strong child welfare program are clear and
simple: first, reduce family poverty by increasing the minimum
wage, instituting a guaranteed income, and enacting aggressive job
creation policies; second, establish a system of national health insurance that covers everyone; third, provide high-quality subsidized
child care, preschool education, and paid parental leave for all fam32
ilies. Increasing the supply of affordable housing is also critical.
The call for supporting families in need harks back to the principles espoused by African-American advocates for child welfare at the
end of the nineteenth century. These advocates contended that the
best way to help children was to help all families and to support,
rather than penalize, mothers who were struggling to care for their
33

children.

Other scholars contend that although general antipoverty measures will have some effect on rates of child abuse and neglect, more
targeted programs are also needed. For example, Marsha Garrison
has argued that "the link between poverty and child maltreatment is
indirect and poorly understood"3 4 and that the connection between
poverty and foster care placement rates, although correlated, is nonlinear.3 5 Professor Garrison agrees that poverty reduction has a role
32 ROBERTS, supranote 14, at 268; see also GUGGENHEIM, supra note 31, at 199-201
(making a similar argument for addressing poverty as a preventive means for addressing child abuse and neglect); Eichner, supra note 26, at 470-71 (same).
33 After the Civil War, African-American women-who were barred from the
child-saving movement of the time, which was generally led by white women-formed
their own groups to address the well-being of children. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Black
Club Women and Child Welfare: Lessons for Modern Reform, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. Rrv. 957,
957-58 (2005). Instead of focusing on a particular case of abuse or neglect, this
movement addressed the well-being of all children and also tried to support, rather
than penalize, mothers, believing that assisting mothers would assist the children. See
id. at 958, 963-71; see also GUGGENHEIM, supra note 31, at 182-83 (describing supports
that used to exist for low-income families).
34 Garrison, supra note 12, at 618.
35 See id. at 617-19. For example, Professor Garrison cites evidence demonstrating that the child poverty rate in the United States is fifteen percent and the foster
care placement rate is seventy-five per ten thousand children. Id. at 617. By comparison, Norway has a child poverty rate of four percent and a placement rate approximately half that of the United States. Id. But despite this correlation, Professor
Garrison contends that the link is nonlinear because the United Kingdom has a child
poverty rate that is several times higher than Norway's and yet has the same placement rate. Id. at 618. Of course, many factors can account for placement rates,
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Barbara Bennett Woodhouse contends that prevention efforts
should focus on more than the relationship between parent and
child. 42 In her view, prevention should encompass an examination of
the systems surrounding a family, including a child's peer group,
neighborhood, and school. 43 Professor Woodhouse terms this
approach an "environmentalist paradigm," contending that the current framework has been partially to blame for the failure to find
effective solutions for reforming the child welfare system. 44 A child's
development depends on all these systems, and therefore child welfare should examine and support these systems, in addition to sup45
porting the family.
In sum, although there may be some disagreement about the precise content of prevention efforts, 46 the risk factors for child abuse
and neglect are well-documented and include (first and foremost)
poverty, substance abuse, mental illness, violence among adult family
studied cost $12,000 per participant, but generated $25,000 in savings for the child
over the period studied. Id. at xviii. Another program cost $6000 per child and generated $24,000 in savings. Id. Interestingly, the programs generated the greatest savings for the state for higher-risk families, whereas lower-risk families in the program
did not generate a net savings to the state. See id. at xix. Additionally, the study
calculated other monetary benefits to society, such as the extra income generated by
participating families, which benefited the overall economy. The study concluded
that in one program, the additional savings were another $24,000, for a total of
$49,000 in benefits to the state compared with the $12,000 cost. See id. at xvii-xix.
For details on all of these findings, see id. at 73-103.
42 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Ecogenerism: An Environmentalist Approach to
ProtectingEndangered Children, 12 VA. J. Soc. Pot'v & L. 409, 423 (2005).
43 See id. at 424-26.
44 See id. at 411-12.
45 See id. at 441-46.
46 Interestingly, even those commentators who generally favor aggressive intervention with a bias toward removal also support prevention programs that address the
underlying causes of child abuse and neglect. For example, legal scholars who
strongly favor "child protection" (intervention with a bias toward removal), such as
Elizabeth Bartholet, see ELIzABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN 110 (1999) (arguing that the "most extreme forms of intervention work best for children"), acknowledge that a more far-reaching program to address racial and economic inequities
would be the ideal approach to child welfare. See id. at 6 ("The starting point for
honest and meaningful debate has to be the recognition that racial and social injustice is at the core of child abuse and neglect. The parents who treat their children
badly are themselves victims, and if we want to stop the vicious cycle, we need to
create a society in which there is no miserable underclass, living in conditions which
breed crime, violence, substance abuse, and child maltreatment."). Bartholet
acknowledges that far-reaching programs to address economic and racial discrimination would be best; she is simply pessimistic (some would say realistic) about the
chances for the adoption of such programs. See id. at 5-6.
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members, single parenthood, teenage parenthood, and a lack of
social supports.4 7 Taking seriously the prevention of child abuse and
neglect would entail addressing these issues and promoting more
targeted programs. The problem, however, is that preventive efforts
have not been widely embraced.
II.

A

CONCEPTUAL BARRIER TO PREVENTION: FAMILY AUTONOMY

In light of the effectiveness of, and the consensus regarding the
need for, preventive efforts, it is striking that prevention remains at
the margins of child welfare. The reasons for this failure are complex, 48 but as I discuss in this Part, the principal conceptual barrier is
the prevailing notion of family autonomy. As we currently conceive of
family autonomy, freedom from state control is the paramount value
in the relationship between the state and families. In the child welfare
system, this conception plays a pervasive and often insidious role. In
this Part, I describe the dominant understanding of family autonomy
that informs American law and culture. I then explore the overwhelmingly negative consequences of this conception of family autonomy for families at risk of involvement in the child welfare system.
A.

Autonomy as Freedom from State Control

There are numerous conceptions of autonomy, but the prevailing
idea of autonomy is the "freedom from" the power of another. Typi47 For an excellent summary of the research in this area, see Garrison, supra note
12, at 613-16 & nn.75-90. I certainly do not mean to imply that all parents fitting this
profile abuse or neglect their children. Indeed, the vast majority do not. As Professor
Garrison points out, "we still lack an understanding of the mechanisms that lead to
child maltreatment and the protective factors that lead most parents to resist the disorder, but environmental conditions that promote child maltreatment have been
charted in detail." Id. at 612. Additionally, I do not mean to imply that child abuse
does not occur in economically stable families. But there are good reasons to believe
there is not the same likelihood that a parent in an economically stable family engaging in the same behavior as a parent in a low-income family-for example, maltreating a child due to the parent's substance abuse-will end up in the child welfare
system. For example, the parent in an economically stable family will likely have
greater support systems and less state surveillance than the parent in the low-income
family. SeeRoBERrs, supra note 14, at 32-33 (noting that substance abuse in economically-stable families typically does not lead to involvement in the child welfare system,
whereas it does in low-income families).
48 For example, costs accrue immediately whereas the benefits accrue over time.
See KAROLY ET AL., supra note 40, at xvi-xix. Additionally, the costs can be borne by
one agency or layer of government while the savings accrue to a different agency or
layer of government. See id. Finally, simple animus toward the poor is also a reason
we have not made these investments.
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choice for her child and, therefore, is not required to send the child
to public school.5 9 In so holding, the Court stated that
[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in
this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children .... The child is not the mere creature of the

State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for addi60
tional obligations.
In addition to determining where to send a child to school,
parental decisionmaking power is typically understood to include, for
example, the authority to make medical decisions for the child 6' and
the authority to decide what religion, if any, the child should follow. 62

The state defers to these parental decisions, assuming parental
behavior does not transgress pre-set norms. If there is such a transgression and it results in child abuse and neglect, the state intervenes
in the family, often removing the child, even if only temporarily, and
placing her in an alternative home. 68 Before a parent crosses this line,
however, family autonomy protects a diversity of decisionmaking
among families.
In addition to these legal manifestations-family integrity and
parental decisionmaking authority-family autonomy as "freedom
from" the state resonates on cultural and political registers. 64 It
presents a neat story, offering a clear line of demarcation between the
state and the family. This plot line is both easy to convey to an audi59 See id. at 534-35.
60 Id. at 535.
61 See 70 CJ.S. Physicians § 116 (2005) ("[fln the absence of an emergency, an
operation performed on a child without the consent of a parent . . . is a legal
wrong.").
62 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 229-34 (1972); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 533-35.
63 For example, a parent may choose how much television a child watches, but if
a parent leaves a young child alone in the home in front of a television while she goes
to work, this may be considered child endangerment. In that situation, the state no
longer defers to parental decisionmaking because the decision of the parent has
transgressed certain limits. But within these limits, family autonomy protects a diverse
range of decisions by parents.
64 Family autonomy is embraced by both liberals and conservatives, as well as, of
course, libertarians. See, e.g., Marc A. Fey, Parental Rights in Education, http://www.
family.org/socialissues/A000000380.cfm (last visited Feb. 22, 2007) (stating that
Focus on the Family "steadfastly oppose[s] any and all domestic and international
efforts of social parenting movements that would define children as wards of the
state" and that "the tentacles of the modern welfare state have muddied [the] idea [of
the state as parent), threatening both parental rights and democracy itself"); see also
BARTHOLET, supra note 46, at 7 (arguing that a cult of family autonomy is perpetuated
and protected by both ends of the political spectrum).
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[ d] ependency ... is an ideological term. In current U.S. policy discourse it usually refers to the condition of poor women with children who maintain their families with neither a male breadwinner
nor an adequate wage and who rely for economic support on a
stingy and politically unpopular government program called Aid to
Families with Dependent Children

(AFDC). .

.

. [N]aming the

problems of poor, solo-mother families as dependency tends to make
them appear to be individual problems, as much moral or psychological as economic. The term carries strong emotive and visual
associations and a powerful pejorative charge. In current debates,
the expression welfare dependency evokes the image of "the welfare
mother," often figured as a young, unmarried black woman (per67
haps even a teenager) of uncontrolled sexuality.
In sum, family autonomy as freedom from state control stands as
the prevailing conception of the relationship between the state and
families. As I argue below, this narrative of autonomous families is
largely inaccurate-the state both supports and intervenes in the lives
of all families.68 But despite this descriptive inaccuracy, there is a pervasive belief, reflected in law and culture, that families can be and are
autonomous of the state. The persistence of this ideal is particularly
problematic in the context of the child welfare system.
violence in her life. It also bolstered her leverage in a rigged labor market designed
for exploitation. Now she had options besides chopping cotton and washing white
people's clothes."); Fraser & Gordon, supra, at 311 (describing how economic supports would enable women to leave abusive relationships).
67 Fraser & Gordon, supra note 66, at 311; accord Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 § 103(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 601 (a) (2)
(2000) (reinforcing the image of dependency as pathological by stating that one of
the goals of the new Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program was to
"end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job
preparation, work, and marriage"); MARTHA ALBERTsON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY
MYTH, at xiv (2004) (describing the "iconic construct of the autonomous individual").
The term "dependency," with this weighted history, is also central to child welfare.
State statutes establishing the child welfare system refer to "dependency and neglect"
as bases for intervention in the family. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CoDE § 300 (West
2005). For an argument that self-reliance need not be caricatured and is a useful
concept, see Amy L. Wax, Social Welfare, Human Dignity, and the Puzzle of What We Owe
Each Other,27 HARv.J.L.& Pua. PoL'V 121,128 (2003) (discussing early reformers and
noting that "they understood very well that the term 'self-reliance' was not to be taken
literally, but rather was a shorthand for a particular type of constructive role in community and economic life" and further arguing that "[cihampions of welfare reform
thus cede no important ground to opponents by acknowledging that self-sufficiency is
never complete and that economic independence for poor families-as for everyone
else-cannot be all or nothing").
68 See infra Part III.A.1.
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B. Autonomy in the Child Welfare System
To be sure, the "freedom from" conception of family autonomy
provides some benefits for families by protecting family integrity and a
diversity of decisionmaking. But for families at risk of involvement in
the child welfare system, the prevailing "freedom from" conception
jeopardizes these very benefits.
The "freedom from" conception informs the legal framework
governing the child welfare system, and establishes that the state lacks
authority to intervene in a family until the parents cross a pre-set line
governing parental behavior. 69 At this crisis stage, the state is authorized to intervene to protect the child. Although a reluctance to intervene can help protect family integrity, the flipside is that it helps
create both a legal and cultural environment that largely absolves the
0
state of affirmative responsibility for the well-being of families.7
Both economically stable families and low-income families have
the same basic needs, including food, housing, child care, health care,
and reliable transportation. Due to their greater financial resources,
economically stable families may be able to satisfy these needs using
their own resources. By contrast, although many low-income families
69 See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 31, at 36-37, 181-85; ROBERTS, supra note 14, at
14-19; Eichner, supra note 26, at 449-50 (describing what she calls the "dominant
model of child welfare"); Woodhouse, supra note 42, at 423 ("The intact and functioning family is proudly autonomous. Provision of services and support is the exception to the rule of autonomy, and generally must be tied to some finding or admission
of family failure and dysfunction.... Thus, the model depends on parental fault as a
predicate for state engagement in the life of a child.").
70 1 do not mean to suggest that the state provides no tangible support for lowincome families. Of course there are some programs designed to help such families.
See, e.g., Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (2000); Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437z-7 (2000)
(establishing HUD § 8 voucher program); Child Care and Development Block Grant
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9858-9858q (2000). My view is that such programs do not
come close to meeting the needs of families. See, e.g., ANNE L. ALSTOTT, No Exr 206
(2004) (describing the meager benefits available to families); Clare Huntington, Welfare Reform and Child Care: A Proposalfor State Legislation, 6 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y
95, 100-05 (1996) (describing the vast unmet need for high quality subsidized child
care, even in the wake of federal and state investments). I recognize that others,
based on their own normative views, consider current programs at best sufficient, and
at worst already too burdensome on the taxpayer and an inappropriate expenditure
of government funds. See, e.g., CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND 154-77, 196-236
(1984) (arguing that public assistance programs should be eliminated because they
encourage joblessness, out-of-wedlock births, and dependence on state aid); JAMES L.
PAYNE, OVERCOMING WELFARE 10-11 (1998) (arguing that the welfare system does not
reduce poverty and encourages "dependent and dysfunctional lifestyles").
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benefit from extensive social networks that enable them to survive, 7 1
some needs require money and for these, the state may be the best, or
72
perhaps the only, source of assistance.
But the "freedom from" conception of family autonomy means
the state does not assume an affirmative responsibility for the wellbeing of families. As discussed below, the state actually does support
all families in numerous ways. 73 But the persistent idea and ideal that
families exist independently of the state, although simply untrue, contributes to the belief that the state need not address the issues facing
low-income families, even though these issues are correlated with
74
higher rates of child abuse and neglect.
The post hoc child welfare system born of this hands-off, crisisoriented approach to families adversely affects children and parents.
By the time the state intervenes, the children have already been
abused or neglected, or are at considerable risk for abuse or neglect,
71

See, e.g.,

72

See MAR-Y

DEPARLE,

ANN

supra note 66, at 79 (describing such support networks).

GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW

308 (1989)

("There is at present in legal discourse little recognition that family members may
need nurturing environments as much as they need rights, or that families themselves
may need surrounding circumstances in order to function at their best. By systematically-though for the most part unintentionally-ignoring the 'little platoons' from
which families and individuals have always drawn emotional and material sustenance,
modern legal systems probably contribute to some extent to their atrophy."); Huntington, supra note 11, at 664-70 (describing the need for tangible assistance); see also
Appell, supra note 65, at 465 (discussing the implications of viewing problems of families as personal and not tied to larger issues of "huge geographic, economic, and
racial barriers to social movement").
73 See infra text accompanying notes 96-107.
74 Numerous caveats apply here. The majority of low-income parents do not
abuse or neglect their children. Some economically stable parents do. And some
parents are wrongly treated by the child welfare system and should not have had their
children removed. See ROBERTS, supranote 14, at 92-99 (describing evidence of racial
bias in child welfare, leading to the overremoval of African-American children from
their homes). But even taking all this into account, as I noted above, see supra notes
17-20, 35-41 and accompanying text, there is an undeniable correlation between
poverty and child abuse and neglect. In light of the economics of low-wage jobs that
force parents to work multiple jobs, the persistence of high crime rates in many
neighborhoods, the lack of quality child care, the dearth of affordable, quality housing, the high cost of transportation, the lack of positive role models, and countless
other forces, it is no wonder many of the basic needs of children are left unattended
in low-income families. And sometimes this inattention crosses the line into abuse
and neglect. I do not mean to suggest that economically stable families do not struggle with at least some of these issues, particularly substance abuse. But, rightly or
wrongly, the substance abuse of economically-stable families typically does not lead to
involvement in the child welfare system, whereas it does for low-income families. See
ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 32-33.
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deteriorated to such a low that
and the lives of the parents likely have
be necessary. In other words, the
state intervention is perceived to
to the parentbeen done, both to children and
damage has already
75
child relationship.
and the state has also
Further, the relationship between families
threat of removing children
been damaged. With the impending
adversarial relationship
from the home, there is a fundamentally cooperation and highThis hinders
between the state and families.
the state and families. At this
between
lights the power imbalance
families is inevitably intrusive and
point, the state's posture towards
judgmental.
from" conception of family
Thus, for poor families, the "freedom
of the conception-protection for
autonomy means that the benefits
decisionmaking-are actually comfamily integrity and a diversity of
itself. The prevailing conception
promised by the very conception
But without state support, a
limits state responsibility for families.
the door for the most intrufamily is more likely to fail, thus opening
removal of children and placesive form of state intervention-the
both family integrity and parental
ment in foster care, which threatens
decisionmaking authority.
C.

Support
The Traditional Trade-Off Between State
and Self-Determination

Both historically
State support, however, is not uncomplicated.
support, especially for low-income
and today, the provision of state
conditions that require the forfeifamilies, has been accompanied by
family decisions. This practice is
ture of at least some authority over
critique of state aid: that
the basis for an important and recurrent
leads to increased regulation
increased support for families inevitably
6 especially for families not within the dominant
of those families,
26
(describing studies demon11, at 661 nn.12275 See Huntington, supra note
for children in foster care).
strating poor long-term outcomes
REv. 1541, 1544
Taking Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L.
Franke,
M.
76 See, e.g., Katherine
for
responsibility
public
of
and the recognition
(2001) ("The granting of rights
some
that
autonomy
in a domain of unrestrained
dependency is unlikely to usher
dependency outside the
for
responsibility
shift
to
liberal projects promise. Rather,
another set of
of rule-the private family-for
family is to exchange one practice
the market."); Jill
those imbued in the state and
regulatory governance practices,
of ParentalRelaA Legal History of the Bifurcated Law
Elaine Hasday, ParenthoodDivided:
prosupportive
(2002) (noting that ostensibly
tions, 90 GEo. L.J. 299, 303, 357-71
for

calling
at a great cost to family autonomy, and
grams, such as welfare, often come
the
change
should
welfare
of
provision
extent the
L.
a debate over "whether and to what
Deborah
Divided];
Parenthood
legal rules of parenthood")

[hereinafter Hasday,
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concern. When
I understand this as the "one-way ratchet"
such families.
of
the conduct
the state aids families, it also regulates
of the
context
in the
As Katherine Franke describes the concern
care work provided in the home,
debate over public responsibility for
private need to public obligathe "delicate act of translation-from
the ways in which public responsition-demands acute sensitivity to
encounter with a broad array of
bility inaugurates a new and complex
primary stewsubjects of
78
public preferences that deprive dependent
which their needs are met."1
ardship over the ways in
for state support
Historically, the exchange of self-determination
For example, British social
was particularly explicit and far-reaching.
that citizenship rights could be
theorist T.H. Marshall contended
group. 7

7

(describing the
HARV. L. REv. 1181, 1184-85 (1994)
Rhode, Feminism and the State, 107
women have
assist
to
policies ostensibly designed
feminist argument that "even state
over racial
glosses
critique
but noting that this
institutionalized their subordination"
in orderpowerful
"equally
are
which themselves
and class differences among women,
STAN. L.
57
Law,
Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family
ing social relations"); see alsoJill
are catefamilies
how laws that affect low-income
REv. 825, 892-98 (2004) (describing
law,
family
of
system
dual
a
to
seen as contributing
gorized as welfare law and thus not
another, more
and
families
economically-stable
in which one set of rules governs
families).
low-income
governs
rules
of
onerous, set
state is a
("For any subordinate group, the
1188
at
77 See Rhode, supra note 76,
Peggy
equality.").
for
struggle
and assistance in the
primary source of both repression
as an
state
the
of
one
state:
the
of
views
conCooper Davis describes two dichotomous
be
must
that
another of the state as a power
enforcer of shared values, and
influence.
state
undue
their own values without
strained, permitting families to form
107 HARv.
the Family Values: The Role of the State,
of
Images
her
Peggy Cooper Davis, Contested
grounding
vision,
latter
the
for
Davis argues
conL. REv. 1348, 1348 (1994). Cooper
She
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
the
argument in a historical understanding
dignity and family liberty animated
human
of
tends that the antislavery tradition
1349-53.
at
Id.
Amendment.
in the Fourteenth
a
principles of liberty and citizenship
requires "that each person be given
Amendment
Fourteenth
the
of
She argues that
character
to the thinking, morally conscious
measure of autonomy appropriate
moral
to allow self-definition and substantial
of
humankind: autonomy sufficient
oppression
of
forms
multiple
describes the
choice." Id. at 1349. Cooper Davis
entered
of family autonomy, noting that slaves
slaves, but in particular the deprivation
legal or
that such arrangements received no
but
into informal familial arrangements,
Davis argues,
social protection. Id. at 1363. As Cooper
offered in response to slavery's
guarantee
a
as
[t]o think of family liberty
it, not as an end in itself, but as
denials of natal connection is to understand
meant to be socialized to uninot
are
a means to full personhood. People
and
People are to be able to form families
form, externally imposed values.
differently
be
might
which children
other intimate communities within
bring different values to the demowould
adults
which
from
socialized and
cratic process.
1371.
at
Id.
78 Franke, supra note 76, at 1541.

HeinOnline -- 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1506 2006-2007

2007]

MUTUAL

DEPENDENCY

IN

CHILD WELFARE

1507

divided into three categories: civil, political, and social. 79 He defined
civil rights as "composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom,"' 0 political rights as "the right to participate in the exercise of
political power,""' and social rights as "the whole range from the right
to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share
to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being
according to the standards prevailing in the society." 82 According to
Marshall, the traditional practice was that if an individual obtained
social rights by receiving support from the state, that person suffered a
de jure forfeiture of political rights and a de facto forfeiture of civil
rights.8 3 Today, although the exchange of civil or political rights for
social rights is far less explicit, the idea that recipients of state aid are
somehow lesser citizens is still implicit in so much of the debate sur84
rounding social welfare programs.
To be sure, all government support is typically accompanied by
some form of regulation or conditions, but when the state supports
low-income families, the regulation and conditions can be particularly
79

See T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (1963), reprinted in THE CITIZEN93, 94 (Gershon Shafir ed., 1998).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See id. at 100 (describing the loss of political rights through legal disenfranchisement and the practical loss of civil rights through internment in a workhouse). Other examples abound. See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE
61-65, 271-72 (2000) (describing the legal disenfranchisement of paupers in United
States, still in operation until the 1960s); Marshall, supra note 79, at 100 (describing
Factory Acts).
84 See, e.g., MURRAY, supra note 70, at 154-77, 196-236 (contending that state aid
encourages unemployment, single parenthood, and government dependence);
PAYNE, supra note 70, at 10-11 (arguing that state aid does not decrease poverty and
instead encourages "dependent and dysfunctional lifestyles"); Daniel J. Mitchell,
Taxes, Deficits, and Economic Growth, THE HERITAGE FOUND., May 14, 1996, http://www.
heritage.org/Research/Taxes/h565.cfm, at I (opining that public assistance undermines productive behavior); Robert Rector, Welfare: A System in Need of Change-Spending on Current Programs Promotes BehavioralPoverty, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, June 27,
SHIP DEBATES

1995, at 15B (commenting that the WELFARE system creates perverse incentives that

promote self-destructive behavior and dependency on the state). Indeed, as scholars
describe it, the current debate over social welfare programs is whether to place claimants in the historical box (paupers whose civil and political rights should be limited
because of their dependency) or to create a new box in which social rights are seen as
a means of obtaining full civil and political rights. See, e.g., CHAD ALAN GOLDBERG,
CITIZENS AND PAUPERS: RELIEF, RIGHTS, AND RACE FROM THE FREEDMEN'S

BUREAUiTO

(forthcoming 2007); Chad Alan Goldberg, Contesting the Status of Relief
Workers Duringthe New Deal The Worker's Alliance of America and the Works ProgressAdministration, 29 Soc. Sci. HIST. 337, 361-62 (2005).

WORKFARE
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the poor are generally based
onerous. Programs intended to benefit
behavior in exchange for beneon a philosophy that seeks to modify
that, in their view,
fits.85 Researchers often focus on certain behaviors

including not graduating
contribute to a decrease in social mobility,
of wedlock or before a person is
from high school, having a child out
and
not working or actively seeking work,
able to support the child,
8 6 Thus, the state typically ties support to the
not abiding by the law.
87
behaviors.
modification of these
can take very intrusive
8 8 For
These behavior modification conditions
self-determination.
familial
forms, deeply infringing upon
assistance rendered a famexample, historically the receipt of welfare
in the middle of the night by case
ily vulnerable to unannounced visits
was to ensure there was not a wage
workers. The purpose of the visit
in
E. Roberts, Welfare Reform and Families
85 Cf Morgan B. Ward Doran & Dorothy
and
(describing
(2002)
386, 391-400, 405-17
the Child Welfare System, 61 MD.L. REv.
welfare
philosophy of TANF and the child
modification
criticizing the behavior
system).
7 J.
Defining and Measuring the Underclass,
86 See Erol Ricketts & Isabel Sawhill,
321 (1988).
POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 316,
reducing
prevention programs are effective in
targeted
87 Additionally, although
those
than
rather
populations,
specific
at
child abuse and neglect, programs directed
See Lawrence R.

come with greater conditions.
generally available to all, typically
and Chaland American Democracy: Findings
Inequality
Jacobs & Theda Skocpol, Studying
R. Jacobs &
(Lawrence
225
214,
DEMoCRACY
lenges, in INEQUALITY AND AMERICAN
of people
programs that reach broad categories
ocial
[S]
("
2005)
eds.,
Theda Skocpol,
they are
that
sense
of 'rights' can enhance citizens'
and deliver benefits as a matter
in the
fully
participate
to
succor and encourage them
deserving recipients of public
people who
of
slices
to
supports
that deliver meager
polity. By contrast, programs
can leave citizens
demeaning procedures to qualify
complicated,
must go through
recipients.").
feeling like disempowered, undeserving
(1994)
MEANING OF MONEY 119-98
SOCIAL
THE
88 See VVIANA A. ZELIZER,
families
low-income
of
spending
to controlling the
(describing changing approaches
that could
families). By contrast, programs
low-income
on
spending
as well as the
widnonworking,
to
as social security payments
also be considered state aid-such
regulation.
extensive
such
been accompanied by
owed spouses-typically have not
Social Security
note 76, at 357-71 (comparing
supra
Divided,
See Hasday, Parenthood
that does not
regime"
normative
"dual
the
of
with TANF benefits as one example
exchange for
in
to relinquish family autonomy
require economically stable families
The concern
families).
of low-income
benefits but does require such relinquishment
as far back as
least
at
traced
be
can
recipients
about the power of the state to control
A. Reich, Individual
in the mid-1960s. See Charles
articles
seminal
Reich's
Charles
1251-56 (1965);
1245,
Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J.
Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging
[hereinafter
(1964)
756-71
73 YALE L.J. 733,
Charles A. Reich, The New Property,
who were depenrecipients,
welfare
that
contended
Reich, The New Property]. Reich
therefore
were vulnerable to the state and
livelihood,
their
for
payments
the
dent on
to
subject
be
should
forms of government supports)
the welfare payments (and other
779-86.
at
Id.
real property.
the same legal protections as traditional
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who could be supporting the
earner (in other words, a man) present
similar visits, concluding that a
family.8 9 The Supreme Court upheld
state assistance, agreed to the state's
welfare recipient, by accepting
90
involvement in her family.
of welfare is often tied to
In a more modern example, the receipt
In California, for example, if a
the regulation of women's sexuality.
been receiving assistance for the
child is born to a woman who has
not receive additional support
previous ten months, the woman will
as a result of contracepfor the child unless the child was "conceived
intrauterine device, a Norplant,
tive failure if the parent was using an
9 1 Moreover, intrusive conditions
or the sterilization of either parent."
rather first and foremost to women
have not been applied equally, but
history of forced sterilization proof color. For example, there is a
Indians, justified in part by
grams for women of color and American
92
women.
the "dependency" of these
family autonomy is partly
The "freedom from" conception of
permits these conditions to be
responsible for the mindset that
presupposes that a famimposed. Because the prevailing conception
it helps create an environment
ily can operate without state support,
It is this deviancy that opens
in which state support is seen as deviant.
Thus, if a family is perthe door to behavior modification conditions. "independent" of the
therefore
ceived to be economically stable and
alone to make decisions about
parents
state, the state largely leaves
state support, it risks losing state
child rearing. But if a family needs
deference to parental decisionmaking.
of family autonomy
The dominant "freedom from" conception
with minimal state supmeans that families take care of themselves
This has particularly detriport, but also minimal state intervention.
involvement in the child welfare
mental effects for families at risk of
37 (describing such "visits").
89 See DEPARLE, supra note 66, at
Amend309, 317 (1971) (rejecting a Fourth
U.S.
90 See, e.g., Wyman v.James, 400
see also
notice);
advance
the mother was given
ment challenge to daytime visits where
government
the
whether
is
("The central question
id. at 328 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
the Constituto 'buy up' rights guaranteed by
power
the
has
largesse
its
by force of
1595, 1599
REV.
Conditions, 73 HARV. L.
tion." (quoting Note, Unconstitutional
919 (9th
916,
F.3d
464
see Sanchez v. San Diego,
(1960))). For a more recent example,
investian
permitted
that
law
in county's welfare
Cir. 2006) (upholding requirement
(2)
claimant,
of
assets
(1)
alia,
inter
to determine,
gator to make an unannounced visit
absence of co-parent).
presence of dependent child, and (3)
(3) (West 2005). There are also excep11450.04(b)
§
CODE
91 CAL. WELF. & INST.
of rape or incest. See id.
children conceived as the result
tions in that law for
2
§ 11450.04(b)(1)-( ).
89-98
KILLING THE BLAC1K BODY

(1997);
92 See DOROTHY ROBERTS,
(1993).
515-16
492,
43 DuKF L.J.
Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb,
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system because it creates a post hoc, rather than a prevention-oriented, system of child welfare. A system that focuses on prevention by
offering additional supports to families must take seriously the concern about increased state regulation of familial decisionmaking. The
challenge, therefore, is to reconfigure the relationship between the
state and families such that the state seeks to invest in families but
does so in a way that fosters rather than hinders familial self-determination. This will require a reconception of the prevailing conception
of family autonomy.
III.

RECONCEIVING FAMILY AUTONOMY

Adopting a prevention-oriented approach to child welfare will
require a new conception of family autonomy. This conception must
center on the need for state support, but not condition that support
on a forfeiture of familial self-determination. In this Part, I first propose that instead of placing freedomfrom state control at the center of
family autonomy, we encourage engagement with the state. Such
engagement is built upon the mutual dependency of the state and
families. I then explore how this engagement need not come at the
price of familial self-determination. To demonstrate that a reconceived family autonomy is possible, I offer three examples of innovative programs that embody the principles I endorse.
My aim is to identify a model of family-state relations that will best
persuade the state to make the necessary investments in prevention.
This structural argument is required because the state cannot be compelled as a matter of legal obligation to provide support. Some scholars have advanced such an argument in the context of the child
welfare system, contending that the state possesses an affirmative legal
obligation to support parents by addressing the underlying issues of
child abuse and neglect.9 3 Locating an affirmative obligation of aid is
93 For example, acknowledging that the Federal Constitution is an unlikely
source of an affirmative right to state support, some scholars have tried to locate an
affirmative obligation in the parens patriae authority of the state. See, e.g., Kay P.
Kindred, God Bless the Child: Poor Children, Patens Patriae, and a State Obligation to Provide Assistance, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 534-36 (1996); Sarah Ramsey & Daan Braveman,
"Let Them Starve" Government's Obligation to Children in Poverty, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1607,
1631, 1634-35 (1995). Although these are creative and important arguments, I
believe such arguments will founder. The current conception of parens patriae
authority in the child welfare system is that when there is evidence of abuse or neglect
of a child, the state is authorized to intervene in the family and act as the "primary
protector of children from abuse and neglect." Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child:A Reappraisalof the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEo. L.J.
887, 893 (1975); accordSANFORD N. KATZ, FAMILY LAW IN AMERicA 132 (2003) ("Histor-
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a steeply uphill battle, however, and not one I intend to wage. Rather,
the arguments for social and economic aid are best couched in terms
94
of structural relations, not legal obligation.
A.

Engaging with the State

The central goal of family autonomy should be to promote familial self-determination, which includes both family integrity and deference to parental decisionmaking. As I explored above, for families at
risk of involvement in the child welfare system, the prevailing conception of family autonomy actually jeopardizes family integrity and thus
parental decisionmaking. 95 For such families, engaging with the state
is a better way of protecting familial self-determination. Targeted prevention programs as well as general antipoverty efforts will enable a
parent to better care for her child, thus reducing the chance that a
ically the state, the ultimate parent who looks after all the children in society under
the parens patriaeconcept, has a right to subject parents to public scrutiny and legal
examination."). Thus, parens patriae authority has generally been understood to
empower the state to intervene to protect a child, but not to impose a concomitant duty
to intervene. See P.W. v. Kan. Dep't Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 877 P.2d 430, 436 (Kan.
1994) ("The doctrine of parens patriae empowers, but does not impose a duty on, the
State to act on behalf of the welfare of those unable to care for themselves."); Ramsey
& Braveman, supra, at 1635 (noting that any language in judicial opinions appearing
to impose an affirmative obligation through the parens patriae doctrine "seems to be
mainly rhetorical"). Moreover, the authority has not been understood to require any
particular manner of intervention, such as addressing poverty rather than simply
removing the child. Finally, it is well-established that an individual cannot raise a
substantive due process claim against the state for the failure to prevent child abuse
and neglect. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
191 (1989).
94 Other scholars have also proposed new models for reworking the relationship
between families and the state, typically arguing that state support plays an important
role in ensuring the well-being of families. See, e.g., ALsTo-rr, supra note 70, at 208-11
(summarizing her argument that society must care for parents as a way of ensuring
the well-being of children); FINEMAN, supra note 67, at 218-40 (advancing the argument for state support of care giving); ROBERTS, supra note 92, at 308-12 (proposing a
new conception of liberty, which "includes not only the negative proscription against
government coercion, but also the affirmative duty of government to protect the individual's personhood from degradation and to facilitate the processes of choice and
self-determination," thus calling upon the state to provide "subsistence benefits, drug
treatment, and medical care"); Eichner, supra note 26, at 463-65 (calling for a "supportive state" approach to child welfare); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Refraining the
Debate About the Socialization of Children: An Environmentalist Paradigm, 2004 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 85, 85 ("1 would replace the paradigm in which parents and the state are
pitted against each other with a paradigm in which parents and the state act as partners in ensuring an environment conducive to children's healthy development.").
95 See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
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crisis will occur and the state will remove the child from the parent's
home. Thus, the provision of state support for families will not
weaken family integrity, and instead stands only to bolster it by giving
parents a better chance of being able to raise their own children.
Just as families need the state, however, the state also needs families. Thus my overarching frame is one of mutual dependency: Families need state support to function, and the state needs functioning
families. This subpart describes this idea in greater detail.
1. Rejecting the Intervention/Nonintervention Frame
The positive description of the state's role in the prevailing conception of family autonomy-the depiction of autonomous families
free from all state intervention-is simply inaccurate. The state intervenes to varying degrees and in varying ways in the lives of all families
at all times. I use as a starting point the insight of Frances Olsen that
state intervention in the lives of families is an inevitable byproduct of
organized government, and that "nonintervention" is a myth. 9 6
96

See Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. Micu. J.L.
835, 836 (1985). Professor Olsen has argued that the "private family," often
the basis for nonintervention, is a myth, or at least an "incoherent ideal." Id. at 835.
Thus the terms "intervention" and "nonintervention" are largely meaningless. Id.
Harkening back to the legal realists' deconstruction of a laissez-faire approach to government as a coherent legal frame, Olsen states that "[a]s long as a state exists and
enforces any laws at all, it makes political choices, The state cannot be neutral or
remain uninvolved, nor would anyone want the state to do so." Id. at 836; accord
GLENDON, supra note 72, at 307-08 ("[D]ebates framed in terms of choice between
intervention and nonintervention are as simplistic and unhelpful as those which try to
distinguish sharply between individual and societal interests. These false dichotomies
tend to obscure the facts that modern governments cannot avoid influencing families,
directly and indirectly, in countless ways and that individuals benefit, not only from
having 'rights,' but also from being surrounded by certain kinds of social arrangements."); Rhode, supranote 76, at 1187 ("One of liberalism's most conspicuous inadequacies is its reliance on public/private distinctions, and its refusal to make gender
inequality in presumptively 'personal' spheres a central political issue.... The dichotomy of 'separate spheres' always has been illusory. The state determines what counts
as private and what forms of intimacy are entitled to public recognition. Policies governing tax, welfare, childcare, family, and workplace issues heavily influence personal
relationships."). Additionally, as feminist theorists have well-described, the state
determines both constitutive questions (which groupings of individuals will win the
moniker "family"), see Martha C. Nussbaum, The Future of Feminist Liberalism, in THE
SUBJECT OF CARE: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON DEPENDENCY 186, 199 (Eva Feder Kittay &
Ellen K. Feder eds., 2002) ("The state constitutes the family structure through its laws,
defining which groups of people can count as families, defining the privileges and
rights of family members, defining what marriage and divorce are, what legitimacy
and parental responsibility are, and so forth. This difference makes a difference: The
REFORM

state is present in the family from the start .

. . ."),

and normative questions of
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by the "ideal of the private fam-

As Olsen elaborates, in the context of the family, opponents of
state intervention would still expect the state to reinforce parental
authority over children by, for example, returning runaway children. 98 Such opponents would equally expect the state to protect the
family from interference by third parties, such as a doctor who would
otherwise perform nonemergency surgery without parental approval,
or a neighbor who would take a child on vacation without parental
approval. 99 Olsen sums up her perspective as follows:
[T] he problem with state officials taking children away from poor
parents is not really a problem of state "intervention," but a problem of the substance of that state behavior. What the state does is
sometimes so bad that people would rather it did nothing-which of
course is not possible. The effort to get the state to do nothing,
even if it were possible, misfocuses attention. It is misguided to
treat freedom as the polar opposite of state "intervention" or of government regulation. As Morris Cohen noted in another context,
real freedom depends upon opportunities supplied by institutions
that involve legal regulation. The attempt to criticize state "intervention" instead of criticizing the particular policies pursued may
be especially limiting for poor people, who often have to rely on
various government programs and are thus less likely to benefit
from any political strategy based on the myth of nonintervention.1 00

Following this line of reasoning, I question whether there is a
meaningful sphere of private (familial) decisionmaking that is separate from, and unaffected by, decisions made by the state. If there is
such a sphere, then the concept of family autonomy has a role to play
in the debate over which decisions should be made by the state and
resource distribution (who will receive the state's largesse and with what strings
attached), see, e.g., Martha Minow, All In the Family & In All Families: Membership, Loving, and Owing, 95 W. VA. L. RPv. 275, 280 (1993) (arguing that it is not possible for
the state to be neutral about the definition of family because such definitions are
necessary for the distribution of legal rights and state largesse).
97 See Olsen, supra note 96, at 835.
98 See id. at 837.
99 Id. Although so-called "protective intervention" has been justified to protect
abused and neglected children or battered women (the idea being that the family
form has broken down, and thus state intervention is necessary to protect the vulnerable), as Olsen argues, this is typically understood as the exception and nonintervention as the norm. See id. at 841-42. As she contends, "focusing on 'nonintervention'
tends to mush and confuse the ethical and political choices we make. It directs our
attention to a false issue and obscures genuine issues of ethics and policy." See id. at
861.
100 Id. at 863.
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family. But if there is not such
which decisions should be made by the
autonomy is analytically bereft
a sphere, then the concept of family
to approach this question is to
with respect to this debate. One way
decision that does not turn, at
try to identify a meaningful familial
the state. I believe it cannot be
least in part, on a decision made by
done.
of familial decisions in two
The state influences the content
the contours of the world
important ways. First, the state determines
parents to make decisions
in which a family lives and then permits
the state has decided that all chilwithin this geography. For example,
decide where to send a child to
dren must be educated. A parent can
her at home, but a parent cannot
school, even choosing to educate
0 1 Even seemingly smaller
decide to forego education altogether.
whether to install sidewalks
decisions made by the state-for example,
development-will, perhaps proin a new housing or commercial
made by a family. Of course simfoundly, affect subsequent decisions
pants on before her shirt or
ple decisions-whether to put a child's
decisions. But the state most cervice versa-are not affected by state
child wears clothes at all, and
tainly does determine whether a
and appropriate in light of, for
whether those clothes are adequate
example, the weather.
authorizing parents to
Second, the state establishes a system
Even those decisions that
make some decisions concerning children.
control, such as a parent deciding
we perceive to be made free of state
made within a decisional framea course of medical treatment, are
Parents can make these 0 decisions
2
work determined by the state.
decisions.'
these
make
to
parents
because the state permits
of family autonomy is
Thus, the ideological construct
relationship between the state
overdeterminate, misstating the actual
exists because, as I argue
and families. We believe family autonomy
is not perceived as such and,
shortly below, some state involvement
a "thing" as autonomy from the
therefore, we believe there is such
Amish
406 U.S. 205 (1972), permitted an
101 The decision in Yoder v. Wisconsin,
234-36.
at
id.
See
fourteen.
of
age
a child from school only after the

family to remove
130
of the Decline of the Public/PrivateDistinction,
102 See Duncan Kennedy, The Stages
A
Market:
the
and
Frances E. Olsen, The Family
U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1351-52 (1982);
more
For
(1983).
1504-06
96 HARV. L. REv. 1497,
Study of Ideology and Legal Reform,
Jill Elaine
between the state and family, see
distinction
the
of
on the barren nature
494-95 (2005). 1
Exchange, 119 HAV. L. REv. 491,
Hasday, Intimacy and Economic
families and
ways to describe state regulation of
acknowledge that there are numerous
used to
families
that
argued
example, it could be
that the baseline is contestable. For
been
has
authority
this
time
over
authority and that
enjoy virtually all decisionmaking
web surroundof the origins of the current regulatory
ceded to the state. Regardless

web exists.
ing families, it is clear that such a
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state. 10 3 In reality, families live and make decisions in the shadow of
the state all day long. To be sure, there is still value in parental decisionmaking. 10 4 But family autonomy oversimplifies the complex relationship between families and the state. Once we acknowledge the
inevitable intertwining of families with the state, the central question
then becomes how and why the state should involve itself with families,
not whether it should do so.
2.

An Alternative Frame: Mutual Dependency

All families need the state. Families who are economically stable
need the state in myriad ways. For example, such families benefit
from state rules governing marriage and divorce, inheritance rights,
and, perhaps most importantly, parental authority vis-A-vis third parties. 0 5 Economically stable families also benefit from the continuation of such supports as public education, the passage of protective
legislation such as the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the availability of child care tax credits. Low-income families also need the state,
and some of their needs, such as for public education, overlap with
the needs of economically stable families. But many of their needs for
state support will differ, and may include such items as subsidized
housing and child care.
The narrative that some families operate without state supportthat they are independent-resonates because of the phenomenon of
background and foreground noise. Some types of state support are so
familiar, we take them for granted and they are not perceived as state
support, but rather simply the state of the world. This type of support
is background noise. Any change from this status quo, however, is
perceived and is suspect. It is foreground noise. The present level
and type of state support of families is not perceived because it has
been normalized. Thus, for example, public education is not perceived as the massive state support program that it most surely is. But
a new form of state support-say, universal child care-changes the
06
status quo and thus is perceived as an aid to families.'
103 See infra text accompanying notes 105-06.
104 See infra Part 111.B.1 (describing the parent-child relationship as playing out
over time and involving the sharing of values).
105 1 recognize these benefits are not equally available to all economically stable
families, notably same-sex couples in the vast majority of states. Such families are at a
disadvantage because they do not enjoy the same protections as families with heterosexual, married parents.
106 Other examples of omnipresent but largely unperceived state support include
the mortgage interest deduction and child care tax credit. According to a recent
report from the General Accounting Office, the federal interest mortgage deduction
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As families need the state, the state also needs families. The current view of family autonomy as "freedom from" does not adequately
account for the state's interest in the well-being of children. This can
be formulated as an interest in ensuring a child develops into a citizen
capable of participating in a deliberative democracy, or, more basically, as an interest in the child growing up to be an adult who
requires minimal state spending. 10 7 For purposes of this Article, and
recognizing many possible criticisms of my term, I refer to this latter
type of adult as a "contributing member of society."
To elaborate on the state's two-fold interest: First, the state has an
interest in the existence of a citizenry capable of participating in a
deliberative democracy.1 0 8 Families play an important role in creating
such citizens (a "formative project," as Linda McClain terms it).109
equaled a $61.5 billion outlay equivalent in 2004, making it the second largest tax
preference outlay equivalent. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABIL1Y OFFICE, UNDERSTANDING THE TAX REFORM DEBATE 12 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d051009sp.pdf. Additionally, different kinds of support resonate in different ways.
For example, the child care tax credit is less controversial than state-sponsored child
care, in part because the former is viewed as state action that allows an individual to
retain more of what she "earned," rather than an affirmative transfer of resources
from the state to a family. It is important to acknowledge that either way the state is
subsidizing the family.
107 I recognize the bias in this formulation. State spending for low-income families is pathologized, whereas other forms of state support, such as Medicare, are not.
108 See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 46 (1958); CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 103-11 (1970); Will Kymlicka & Wayne Norman,
Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory, 104 ETHICS 352,
352-53 (1994); Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE
LJ. 330, 344-48 (2006). The Supreme Court has recognized this interest. See Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944) ("A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as
citizens, with all that implies."). For a discussion of how our traditional governmental
structures may hinder participation, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer's Role(s)
in DeliberativeDemocracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 347, 351-59 (2005).
109 Linda McClain has written about this extensively. See LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE
PLACE OF FAMILIES 3, 17 (2006). Professor McClain describes the role of families "in
the project of forming persons into capable, responsible, self-governing citizens" and
argues that such "[a] formative project aims at fostering persons' capacities for democratic ... self-government .... " "Democratic self-government connotes what democratic theorists refer to as 'deliberative democracy' and implicates a person's capacity
to deliberate about his or her conception ofjustice .... " Id. Anne Dailey also makes
an interesting argument about the role families play in creating citizens capable of
participating in a deliberative democracy.

See Anne Dailey, Developing Citizens, 91

L. REv. 431, 438-61 (2006). Professor Dailey argues that "acquir[ing] the integrated cognitive and emotional capacities of mature reasoned thinking" is essential to
participation in a deliberative democracy. Id. at 433. She further contends that "the
integrated psychological capacities for personal self-reflection and emotional self-masIOWA
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But some families need social and economic supports to function better and thus be able to undertake the formative project-ensuring
that as many individuals as possible are able to participate in the collective enterprise we call a democratic society.""
Some scholars argue that the family is not the appropriate locus
for building the capacity of children. If families themselves are rife
with inequality, they are hardly the place to instill civic values and
notions ofjustice.I It has also been suggested that families exist for
other purposes and that they simply are not very good at this particular job, and instead such capacity-building should occur in the schools
and other public institutions. 1 2 I recognize these arguments, but I
tery," id. at 433, which curb the "regressive compulsions, urges, and desires that can
threaten to overwhelm mature ego functions," are learned through the relationship
between a very young child and her caregiver. Id. at 481. Left unchecked, these
.regressive impulses . . .threaten our democratic way of life from inside the body
politic" because they can lead to a "collective regression," which breaks down the
"normal processes of collective deliberation." Id. at 479, 481. Dailey cites several such
examples, such as the Japanese internment during World War II, which she contends
was a "massive failure[ in the reasoned judgment of legal decisionmakers and ordinary citizens." Id. at 480.
110 This plays into a larger debate among political theorists about the role of state
support and participation in a democracy. On the one hand, it has been argued that
state support of those in need can be conceived of as a precondition to participation.
For example, T.H. Marshall argued that a welfare state is necessary to ensure all members of society can participate fully because without economic security (social rights),
a person cannot exercise her civil and political rights. See Marshall, supra note 79, at
93; supra text accompanying notes 79-83 (defining and describing the relationship
between civil, political, and social rights). This is in contrast to the view that citizens
have a responsibility to be economically self-sufficient. This latter view can be summarized as follows:
Whereas Marshall had argued that social rights enable the disadvantaged to
enter the mainstream of society and effectively exercise their civil and political rights, the New Right argues that the welfare state has promoted passivity
among the poor, without actually improving their life chances, and created a
culture of dependency. Far from being the solution, the welfare state has
itself perpetuated the problem by reducing citizens to passive dependents
who are under bureaucratic tutelage.
Kymlicka & Norman, supranote 108, at 355-56. In this way, economic independence
is a precondition of full membership in society. See id. at 356. My vision of family
autonomy-engagement with the state, not freedom from it-is firmly on the side of
state support as a precondition of civic engagement.
111 See, e.g.,
Susan Moller Okin, Women, Equality & Citizenship, 99 QUEEN'S Q 56,
65 (1992) (arguing that children learn about male dominance over women in the
family setting).
112 See Kymlicka & Norman, supra note 108, at 364. Kymlicka and Norman argue
that families and other voluntary organizations cannot do all the work of preparing
citizens:
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believe families are still crucial players in the development of citizens.
In addition to a family's ability, in at least some instances, to teach
democratic values, families play an essential role in preparing a child
to engage in other settings. For example, even if schools are a better
locus for learning civic virtues, a child must arrive at school able to
learn such virtues. If the child's basic needs have not been met at
home, it will be harder to build her capacity when she is at school.1 13
Moreover, apart from the important goal of preparing future citizens, the state also has an interest in families functioning well enough
that they produce contributing members of society. Again, families
play a key role here, given the overwhelming evidence that chronic
poverty poses serious risks to the emotional, cognitive, and physical
development of children, 1 4 regardless of whether the family is
involved in the child welfare system. If the state provided appropriate
social and economic supports, families likely would function better
and thus be able to do the important work of raising children who will
become contributing members of society.
Additionally, the state has an economic interest in providing this
kind of support. Although the message is so often lost in our shortsighted political climate, preventive programs both work and are
cheaper than "back-end" programs like foster care and the criminal
While these associations may teach civic virtue, that is not their raison d'etre.
The reason why people join churches, families, or ethnic organizations is not
to learn civic virtue. It is, rather, to honor certain values and enjoy certain
human goods, and these motives may have little to do with the promotion of
citizenship.
Id.
113 See Dailey, supra note 109, at 458. Professor Dailey acknowledges the important role of educational and civic institutions, but notes that "educational institutions
must build upon psychological structures and processes cultivated and established in
the very earliest years. Early family relationships play a foundational role in fostering
the emotional and cognitive mechanisms... upon which a liberal democratic education can then build." Id.
114 See, e.g., ARLoC SHERMAN, POVERTY MATTERS 3-4 (1997) (describing risks associated with child poverty, such as the two times higher risk of being a dropout at ages
sixteen through twenty-four and the 3.4 times greater risk of being expelled from
school); J. Lawrence Aber et al., The Impact of Poverty on the Mental Health and Development of Very Young Children, in HANDBOOK OF INFANT MENTAL HEALTH 113, 118-21
(Charles H. Zeanah,Jr. ed., 2d ed. 2000); GregJ. Duncan et al.,
Economic Deprivation
and Early Childhood Development, 65 CHILD DEV. 296, 311-15 (1994); Aletha C. Huston
et al., Children and Poverty: Issues in Contemporary Research, 65 CHID DEv. 275, 277-79
(1994); Vonnie C. McLoyd, Socioeconomic Disadvantage and Child Development, 53 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 185, 190-98 (1998). Of course there is some resilience on the part of
children. See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 11, at 683 n.227 (citing Emmy E. Werner,
Children of the Garden Island, Sci. Am., Apr. 1989, at 106).
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15 and the adage of "pay now or pay
justice system. Examples abound,
1 1 6 Although some programs, such as universal, quallater" is a truism.
up-front investment, these
ity child care, would entail considerable
1 7
And, importantly, some child
investments do pay off over time.
such as the Nurse-Family
abuse and neglect prevention programs,
relatively little to implecost
Partnership program described below,
18
results.'
ment and yet have striking
PUB. POLICY, BENEFITS AND
ET AL., WASH. STATE INST. FOR
YOUTH 6 tbl.1 (2004),
INTERVENTION PROGRAMS FOR
COSTS OF PREVENTION AND EARLY
forth preventive
(setting
.pdf

115

See, e.g.,

STEVE

Aos

available at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/04-07-3901
SENTIas well as those that do not); CHILDREN'S
programs that save the state money,
available
1, 3 (2004),
PROGRAM, THE SAFETY NET0 IN Ac-TION
NEL NUTRITION ASSESSMENT
4.pdf (noting that "food insecuat http://dcc2.bumc.bu.edu/csnappublic/CSNAP20
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in
toddlers
and
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and that
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likely
more
percent
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amount
same
that
an average of $11,300, whereas
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would buy food stamps for a family
outcare have particularly poor long-term
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children
116 For example,
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upheaval
and neglect or the subsequent
23
comes, whether from the initial abuse
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Emily
As
.
n.1
supra note 11, at 661
placement in foster care. See Huntington,
or paying later:
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paying
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medical coverage; funding for preand
assistance
cash
[t]he entitlement to
therand job training programs, family
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care are all
child
for
funding
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apy services, and drug treatment;
or elimination, in the name of shrinkvulnerable to congressional reduction
for children to their parents.
ing government and shifting responsibility
this "shrinkage" will be the
of
products
Ironically, one of the predictable
that does so poorly at replacing the
bloating of that very part of government
parparents. A true interest in helping
care, love, and authority provided by
should
intervention
by government
ents to do their job unencumbered
of public assistance that allows as many
kind
the
precisely
for
support
inspire
conceivable intrusion on family
parents as possible to avoid the greatest

child
caused by the intervention of the
autonomy-the intrusion inevitably
welfare system.
431, 440 (1996). In
Parents Wronged, 57 OHio ST. L.J.
Emily Buss, Parents' Rights and
from
approach to child welfare differ
this way, the arguments for a capacity-building
supra
FINEMAN,
support of care work. See, e.g.,
those advanced by feminists for state
giving).
care
of
argument for state support
note 67, at 218-40 (advancing the
163-203 (2006)
THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION
CHECCHI,
117 See, e.g., DANIELLE
supra
Huntington,
education);
in
on investments
(documenting economic return
care).
child
quality
in
return on investments
note 70, at 136-39 (describing long-term
see infra notes 142-50 and accompanying
below,
detail
118 As I explore in greater
ET AL.,
$8700 per family, seeJUDITH GLAZNER
text, that program costs approximately
EXPENDITURES FOR VULPARTNERSHIP ON GOVERNMENT
EFFECT OF THE NURSE FAMILY
NEW YORK, MEMPHIS,
AND THEIR CHILDREN IN ELMIRA,
NERABLE FIRST-TIME MOTHERS
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gov/programs/opre/welfareemploy/economic-analysis/reports/effect
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Whether the state's interest is characterized as one of preparing
citizens or preventing future expenditures, or both, these interests are
not furthered by the prevailing conception of family autonomy. That
conception contributes to the state's failure to take affirmative responsibility for the well-being of families.
The need of the state for families-indeed, the dependency of
the state on families-is mirrored by the need of families for state
support both in building the capacity of children and preparing them
to be contributing members of society. I understand this as the
mutual dependency of the state and families. A mutual dependency
frame acknowledges that all families need the state to some degree
and that the state has a keen self-interest in meeting those needs.
3.

Taking Mutual Dependency Seriously

If mutual dependency of the state and families is both an apt
description of and prescription for the relationship between the state
and families, the challenge then is to determine how each institution
can best help the other. I propose a model of parent-state collaboration that views the healthy functioning of parents as essential to providing services to children. This approach centers on mutual
dependency: The state has a strong interest in the well-being of children, especially very young children, but the state largely cannot
reach these children without engaging parents. 119 Parents have a
effect.nursefam.pdf, and yet has a dramatic effect on rates of child abuse and neglect,
see David L. Olds, Prenataland Infancy Home Visiting by Nurses: From Randomized Tials to
Community Replication, 3 PREVENTION SCi. 153, 161-62 (2002). Children in the program have an eighty percent lower rate of child abuse and neglect as compared with
similarly situated children. See id.; see also Office of juvenile justice & Delinquency
Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Nurse-Family Partnership, http://www.dsgonline.
com/mpg2.5//TitleV MPGTable_lnd_Rec.asp?id=368 (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
119 Let me be clear about the goal of the state's investments. I believe the state
should work toward equal opportunity, but not necessarily equal results, for families.
It is up to the parents to realize this opportunity. I should also add that state supports
should not focus solely on the parent-child relationship. Prevention and long-term
treatment should look at all the systems around a child. See Woodhouse, supra note
42, at 425-26; Woodhouse, supra note 94, at 85-86 ("An ecological theory, in contrast
to the child/parent/state triangle of constitutional theory . . . envisions children at
the center of concentric circles of human and natural systems. Rather than proposing normative principles such as rights and duties, an ecological theory is descriptive
of the world as the child knows and experiences it."). Woodhouse terms this
approach "ecogenerism." Id. at 86. These systems range from those that directly
touch the child, such as the family (immediate and extended), neighborhood, school,
and peer group, to those systems that are not in direct contact with the child but
nonetheless influence the child, such as a parent's workplace. See Woodhouse, supra
note 42, at 425-26.
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strong interest in the well-being of their children, but they may not be
able to realize that interest without support from the state. To serve
these interests, the state should support families through general antipoverty measures as well as targeted prevention programs. Both are
essential to improve the well-being of children generally and prevent
child abuse and neglect specifically.
To elaborate, the state already, if inadequately, invests in older
children, largely through the public education system. But it is not
enough to invest in public institutions. If the goal is to protect the
well-being of children, the state needs to focus in particular on very
young children, especially in light of research establishing that the
time between birth and age three is a vitally important period of child
120

development.

To support very young children, the state could make some direct
investments in children, such as the provision of health care. But the
point that is so often missed is that the state must also invest in children indirectly by attending to the needs of parents. Very young children are predominantly with their families-not in schools or other
public institutions-during the key developmental phase. Therefore,
to protect these children, the state should support parents, enabling
them to care well for their children. I do not intend to explore here
the myriad ways the state can provide social and economic support to
parents,
but rather to argue the necessity of its doing so.
120

See, e.g., CINDY

Es (2003). But see JANE
18-20 (2006) (arguing that some of the age zero
to three debate has exaggerated the importance of the early years, which are not
"critical" in the sense that this is the only opportunity for child development, and that
both the early and later years are important to child development).
121 As I have said repeatedly in this Article, preventing child abuse and neglect will
entail a combination of general antipoverty programs as well as more targeted programs, such as the Nurse-Family Partnership. For two interesting proposals for how
the state could immediately begin supporting families, see ALsTrowr, supra note 70, at
75-85, 117-37 (proposing "caretaker resource accounts" and "life-planning insurance"). One example of the kind of social support the state is beginning to offer
families are programs aimed at creating "healthy marriages." See Erik Eckholm, Program Seeks to Fight Poverty by Building Family Ties, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2006, at A13
(describing $750 million earmarked in the federal welfare reauthorization bill for
"healthy marriage" and "responsible fatherhood" programs). These programs are
certainly subject to debate. Critics contend the promotion of marriage does little to
address the economic problems of poverty. See id. I agree that promoting marriage
(or, perhaps less controversially, promoting healthy relationships) will not alone ameliorate poverty, but I do believe that teaching relationship skills, particularly how to
manage conflict, is important for all couples. Indeed, "couples therapy" is widely
accepted practice among upper- and middle-class families, who are able to pay for
such support themselves. See id.
OSER & JULIE COHEN, AMERICA'S BiA

WALDFOGEL, WHAT CHILDREN NEED
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Supporting very young children is simply widening our lens of
state responsibility. For example, public education can be seen as a
form of support that the state undertakes with the goal of creating
informed, capable citizens.1 22 Thus, the state assumes an enormous
responsibility for children beginning at age five. But there is no reason why this responsibility should begin at that particular age. It
could be later; it could be far earlier. The point about foreground
and background noise is relevant again. Although it may seem politically impossible for the state to undertake the necessary investments
to support younger children, one reason for this is that these investments would be new and thus more perceptible. Because an investment in public education has become part of the fabric of society, it
has faded into background noise and thus is not perceived as the
capacity-building or protective investment that it is. In this way, advocacy of universal, state-subsidized child care appears to be a call for a
new role for the state, but arguing in favor of publicly funded education does not. There is not a meaningful difference between these
two types of investments, however, just a difference in familiarity and
123
thus perception.
122 See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 79, at 100 ("NWlhen the state guarantees that all
children shall be educated, it has the requirements and the nature of citizenship definitely in mind. It is trying to stimulate the growth of citizens in the making."); Liu,
supra note 108, at 335, 341-48 (arguing that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, coupled with Section 5, oblige Congress to ensure meaningful educational opportunity for all children as a way of securing the "full membership, effective
participation, and equal dignity of all citizens in the national community").
123 When deciding to make these investments, another issue to address will be
determining the scope of the investment. If providing economic and social supports
is a responsibility of the state, this raises the question of where the responsibility ends.
For example, when the state seeks to subsidize housing, will the provision of a
voucher sufficient for obtaining an apartment in a run-down neighborhood satisfy the
state's responsibility? Or must the state guarantee a decent apartment in a low-crime
neighborhood? A single-family home? See Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A
Few Troubling Questions About VWere, Why, and How the Burden of Carefor Children Should
Be Shifted, 76 CmI.-KENT L. REV. 1753 (2001). As Professor Case has argued, viewing

children as a public good raises questions such as the extent to which the state should
subsidize children-how much is enough?-and whether the state should subsidize
all children and all parents equally, see id. at 1771-73, knowing that some parents are
less well-equipped to parent and some children will not "produce positive externalites," id. at 1775. Professor Case advances these arguments in the context of the care
debate. In the child welfare context, some of her arguments are less relevant because
it is not simply a question of shifting economic burdens from those with children to
those without. In the child welfare system, the public is paying one way or the other
and the question is how to maximize public payments. I contend preventive measures
are a better use of tax dollars than back-end programs such as the maintenance of
half a million children a year in foster care. That said, it is still relevant to explore
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both moral and practiMy argument for state support is based on
the well-being of children
cal grounds. A just state should ensure
deserve the protection of the
because our most vulnerable citizens
children from their parents,
state. But unlike those who would rescue
protect children by supporting
my argument is that the state can best
to this moral obligation, the
the functioning of families. In addition
a prevention-oriented approach
state has a keen practical interest in
harm to both parents and chilto child welfare because it will reduce
in the development of future citidren and serve the state's interest
of society. By differentiating the
zens and contributing members
from the practical achievement of
moral dimension of my argument
in the state accepting the moral
it, I am arguing that there is value
to child welfare. Indeed, even if
imperative of this kind of orientation
the child welfare system,
the state spent no additional monies on
state support of families
and
acknowledging the need for prevention
from the current approach
would be a radical and beneficial change
role we all play in creating the cirbecause it would acknowledge the and neglect. 1 24
abuse
cumstances that lead to child
programs.
of directing limited funds to preventive
such issues as the opportunity cost
economic
and
social
to
entitled
that families are

Further, I do not make the claim
families
to thrive. Rather, my baseline is that
supports that would enable the families
child
possible,
as
to prevent or remedy, as much
should receive the supports necessary
needed
environment
the
should help create
abuse and neglect. This level of support
or, at the very least, help prepare chilproject
formative
the
for families to undertake
dren to be contributing members of society.
of "bad"
help us move away from the narrative
124 This acknowledgement would
or
abused
have
about whether parents who
parents. I refer here to the debate
Parents
of
Rights
The
See, e.g., Symposium,
neglected their children are undeserving.
from Economic Hardship and the Predictive
Arising
Removals
Care:
Foster
with Children in
("It
(2003) (statement of Martin Guggenheim)
Power of Race, 6 N.Y. Crrv L. REv. 61, 74
shocking
a
is
There
to mention for a minute.
is the element of hatred that I wish
by a lot of things-that the parents of
otherness,
by
fear,
by
presumption generated
or
children. They don't love them enough
children in foster care are bad for their
30
my
in
that
them well. And I'm here to say
they don't have the ability C] to raise
the most
most despicable slander of all,. and
the
is
years of work in this field, that
Children,
Vulnerable
The Tyranny of Time:
difficult falsity to refute."); Catherine J. Ross,
J. Soc.
VA.
11
Proceedings,
Termination
Parental
"Bad" Mothers, and Statutory Deadlinesin
own
their
in
that many parents are "victims
POL'Y & L. 176, 179 (2004) (noting
curthe
in
bias"
"blood
46, at 7 (decrying the
right"). But see BARTHOLET, supra note
views
that
debate
the
of
side
the
firmly on
rent child welfare system). I place myself
system as individuals who are well-intenwelfare
child
the
in
parents
of
the majority
to raise
under extremely difficult circumstances,
tioned and trying their best, often
their children well.
not
the child welfare system, and should
Some parents are wrongly treated by
evi(describing
92-99
at
14,
note
supra
have their children removed, see ROBERTS,
African-American
of
overremoval
the
to
leading
dence of racial bias in child welfare,
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In sum, making state support the centerpiece of the child welfare
system will reduce poverty, lead to less child abuse and neglect, and
enable individuals to lead productive lives. Moreover, these preventive measures would, in many cases, preclude the need for the radical
intervention that typifies the current system. To be sure, participation
in the preventive programs I envision would be voluntary. Thus, a
parent who refuses such support and then abuses or neglects her
child would still face involvement in the child welfare system. Further,
a parent who receives state support but abuses or neglects her child
also would face the system. In this way, the "stick" of the child welfare
system would remain despite the greater emphasis on prevention. But
a prevention-oriented approach to child welfare would at least introduce a "carrot," a vast improvement over the current stick-only system.
B. FurtheringSelf-Determination
A conception of family autonomy built upon an understanding of
mutual dependency must address the trenchant concern that state
support of families is necessarily accompanied by state control of families. Although engagement with the state likely will further family
integrity, by contrast, state support runs the risk of diminishing parental decisionmaking authority. The challenge is to provide support in a
12 5
way that fosters that authority.
1. Concerns About a Diversity of Decisionmaking
Before addressing how to protect parental decisionmaking, I
want to define broadly the nature of that decisionmaking authority.
children from their homes), while other parents have made poor decisions but, in
different circumstances, would have acted in a different manner. I therefore reject
the notion that parents who abuse or neglect their children should lose state deference to their decisions regarding the rearing of their children. I recognize that this is
the legal framework governing the child welfare system-parents who do not abuse
and neglect their children are viewed as good parents and thus deserving of state
deference. But parents with a poor "track record" lose their entitlement to this deference. My argument is that we should rethink this simple exchange. To be sure, some
children face tremendous risks in their own homes. I am not arguing that child abuse
or neglect is benign or that parents do not actually engage in such behavior. Rather,
my point is that with additional social and economic supports, many parents would be
able to meet the needs of their children because they would make different choices.
125 See Nedelsky, supra note 49, at 13 ("The characteristic problem of autonomy in
the modern state is not, as our tradition has taught us, to shield individuals from the
collective, to set up legal barriers around the individual which the state cannot cross,
but to ensure the autonomy of individuals when they are within the legitimate sphere
of collective power. The task is to render autonomy compatible with the interdependence which collective power (properly used) expresses.").
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This authority is traditionally understood as the right to make large,
discrete decisions, such as which religion, if any, the child should follow, and which school the child should attend. The state cannot interfere in a particular decision made at a particular time. But conceiving
of parental decisionmaking as a series of discrete events, occurring
intermittently, misstates the nature of raising children. Parental decisionmaking that occurs over time is the essence of raising children.
Although there may be a few key decisions, child-rearing is much
more about the accumulation of small decisions. It is an ongoing
project.
If raising children is about a long-term social relationship, traditional notions of family autonomy misconceive the nature of the
autonomy needed. It is not only the freedom to make a particular
decision, but also the freedom to raise children consistent with a set of
values, which will be played out over time. Thus, autonomy takes on a
particular meaning in the context of families, and this meaning is
about the dynamic process of raising children, not protecting only an
isolated, static decision.
Returning to the challenge of accommodating state support and
parental decisionmaking authority, the state does have legitimate reasons for conditioning the receipt of aid. For example, conditions
imposed by the state to ensure that public monies are used for their
intended purpose protect the state fisc and promote accountability to
the taxpayer.1 26 But there is a danger that the state will impose conditions that go beyond these legitimate interests and instead seek to
usurp parental decisionmaking. 12 7 If the state offered universal
health care, it could be argued that parents would have an obligation
to use such medical care, even if doing so contravened their personal,
but not religiously based, views on appropriate medical care. For
example, a parent may believe in holistic medicine and therefore
choose an alternative-and for the sake of the hypothetical-ineffective treatment for a serious but not life-threatening childhood illness.
126 Acknowledging that there are legitimate state interests does, of course, beg the
question of how to define those interests. For example, some readers might argue
that the state has a legitimate interest in encouraging certain behavior and therefore
can and should impose behavior-modification conditions on the receipt of state support, even if those conditions infringe on parental decisionmaking authority. I
address this argument below. See infra notes 127-39 and accompanying text.
127 I recognize that in some instances government regulation can foster, not hinder, parental decisionmaking. For example, legal requirements that manufacturers
of certain electronic equipment install blocking devices enable a parent to exercise
greater control over the content that reaches her child. Although such examples

exist, my point is that regulation of low-income families is far more likely to diminish,
rather than augment, familial self-determination.
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Given the availability of medical care, the state could argue that the
parent neglected the child by not pursuing the course of treatment
approved by mainstream medicine and paid for by the state.
Although imposing conditions on families is, arguably, paternalistic, in the current political climate such conditions are inevitable.
Therefore, the question is whether it is possible to mitigate the very
real concern that receiving state aid will be contingent on a parent
forfeiting her right to make decisions-large and small, today and
over time-for her child. Put more broadly, the challenge is how to
overcome the deeply entrenched history of exchanging self-determination for state support. From the perspective of the parent, the question is what stands to be lost if the parent accepts state support to raise
a child. And from the perspective of the state, the question is what
types of conditions are necessary to protect the state's legitimate
interests.
Answering these questions is not easy and there is no silver bullet.
Rather, it is important to acknowledge these real and substantial concerns and then to explore a few ways to mitigate the concerns. The
relationship between the state and families that I envision looks something like this: Families are provided the social and economic supports needed to prevent child abuse and neglect, which will be a
combination of general antipoverty policies and more targeted programs. At the same time, these supports are not overly conditioned
on the recipient engaging in any particular behavior, but rather on
the understanding that parents, even those who have abused or
neglected their children in the past, will generally make good decisions for themselves and their children, and that parents are in the
best position to assess their family's needs. 128 I have several proposals
for how the state can provide support in a manner that does not compromise parental decisionmaking.
First, despite the normative control the state can exert when supporting families, it is possible for the state to act in a manner that
enhances a family's self-determination. Indeed, this is what the state
128 It could be argued that "freedom from" includes the option for parents to
make bad decisions. Thus the question is whether social and economic supports are
truly facilitating familial self-determination, or whether there is necessarily a heavy

hand of incentives or requirements that accompany any kind of state support. Even
required education or drug treatment could be viewed as infringing on personal pre-

rogatives. In response to this anticipated argument, let me clarify that I am not proposing complete state deference to parental decisionmaking. Rather, my argument is

that within the general constraints of what society has determined to constitute minimally adequate parenting, the state should do more to help parents meet these standards, rather than simply penalizing parents after they fail to do so.
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when it offers a child care tax
does for economically stable families
a child care provider of her
129
credit that enables a parent to select
made to that provider.
choice and receive a tax credit for payments
a manner that does not overly
Thus, knowing it is possible to act in
ask whether a proposed
condition aid, the state should consistently
or hinders a family's selfcondition on the receipt of aid furthers
self-determination, it must then
determination. If it hinders familial
13 0
state interest.
be justified by a stronger countervailing
But one guiding
Of course these categories are not perspicuous.
similar aid to economically stable
principle is to determine whether
child care credit is a good examfamilies is similarly conditioned. The
to use state-approved child
ple. The state does not require parents
credit. Therefore, a child care
care as a condition of receiving the
to obtain child care should
voucher that enables a low-income parent
either.
not be conditioned on this requirement

those decisions that the state
Further, we can distinguish between
decisions that a parent has experhas expertise in making and those
decisions that are better left to the
tise in making. There are some
on extensive studies, which substate, such as determining, based
are effective and therefore should
stance abuse treatment programs
better able to
13 1
By contrast, a family is far132
be subsidized by the state.
needed.
are
supports, if any,
determine for itself what
may
Credit, 26 U.S.C. § 21 (2000). A parent
129 See Child and Dependent Care
credit is not
the
fit;
deems
parent
the
individual,
choose any provider, including an
a tax
Id. § 21 (b) (2) (D). The ability to take
providers.
care
child
licensed
limited to
See
strings.
fewer
of the state attaching even
deduction for dependents is an example
id. § 152.
that would override familial self-determina130 An example of a state requirement
tion is childhood immunizations.
state
decisions that should be made by the
131 In making the distinction between
at
56,
note
supra
Buss,
See
Buss.
of Emily
versus the family, I draw on the insights
developshould guide the allocation of
29-35 (arguing that "relative competencies"
parents greater control over matters
giving
state,
mental control between parent and
has a
control over matters in which the state
with only private effects, and the state
in
participate
to
ability
affects an individual's
direct stake, such as education, which
noted
Buss

and economy"). As Professor
and contribute to "a healthy democracy
give parents the
parent and would "do better to
elsewhere, the state is not a good
440.
at
Buss, supra note 116,
means to be good parents themselves."
such experwelfare system that recognizes
child
the
132 One process for families in
See
elsewhere.
detail
in
which I have addressed
tise is family group conferencing,
that
recognizes
conferencing
group
672-87. Family
Huntington, supra note 11, at
needs
to make in determining their own
contribution
considerable
a
have
families
group
family
In
it listens to families on this score.
and that the state benefits when
example,
needed-for
are
determines what supports
conferencing, the family itself
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The state can also design programs in a manner that furthers
familial self-determination. Although vast cash transfers from the
state to the family for the family to use as it sees fit arguably would
maximize familial self-determination,' 3 such transfers are unlikely to
transpire. But the design of programs can recognize a family's expertise in itself.13 4 In short, the actual interaction with the state makes a
difference.13 5 And if the state views familial self-determination as a
value the state has an interest in promoting, it will be more inclined to
do so. This self-determination is essential if families are to maintain
their distinctive role in our society as incubators for connectivity and
diverse values.'

36

Second, there are important lessons to be learned from the harmreduction model of social services. In that approach, the state
acknowledges that conditioning state support on certain behavior is
not always to the benefit of the recipient or the state. For example, in
the Housing First program, the state provides housing to the chronichild care, or transportation, or housing-and the state seeks to provide such
supports.
133 Cash transfers maximize decisionmaking in part because the effects of conditions on benefits are not uniform. For example, if the state determined that a parent
could receive a child care credit only if the parent did not live with a same-sex partner, this would not, in practical terms, affect the majority of recipients. In this way,
the burdens of conditions often are not evenly shared.
134 See supra note 132 (discussing family group conferencing).
135 See Nedelsky, supra note 49, at 14 ("The nature of people's interactions with
bureaucratic decision-making may be as important as the nature of legislative policymaking in determining whether citizens are autonomous members of a democratic
society or dependent subjects of collective control." (footnote omitted)). Of course
state programs will entail some level of bureaucratization, which itself can be onerous.
But this is not my concern here. Instead, I am concerned about the types of conditions that infringe on familial self-determination in a meaningful way, such as by permitting the state to visit the home unannounced, or by penalizing a family by refusing
benefits for multiple children.
136 See Areen, supra note 93, at 893 ("The state's desire to maintain family autonomy is not only a matter of tradition, but also reflects a recognition of the family's
effectiveness as a social institution; no one has devised a better system for overseeing
the rearing of most children. Autonomous families not only provide the conditions
needed for the physical and emotional development of individual children, but also
make possible a religious and cultural diversity that might disappear if the state extensively regulated or controlled child rearing."); cf Dailey, supra note 109, at 500-01
(articulating a principle for federal support of families which "assumes there is no
bright line between the private family and the State, and seeks instead to determine
the kinds of governmental action that usurp, rather than reinforce, the family's childrearing role," and noting that where the line is drawn "turns in part on the distinction between inculcating particular moral values or life goals and securing conditions
that allow individuals eventually to choose those values and goals for themselves").
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cally homeless-individuals who are often struggling with multiple
problems, such as substance abuse and mental illness-without imposing any conditions on the recipient. 13 7 This approach has been very
successful, leading to better outcomes for the recipient (long-term
housing, more stable mental health, and less substance abuse) and
much lower costs for the state. 3" Thus, purely as a policy matter, it is
important to ask whether conditions actually further the goals of the
program or whether, at least in some instances, conditioning support
is unnecessary or even detrimental to achieving the goals of the
program.
Third, a change in cultural attitudes towards low-income families
would go a long way toward overcoming the potential paternalism of
the state. The state trusts all families to raise children and make decisions all day long. There is no reason why this trust should be diminished simply because the parent is using state money to effect her
decisions. Additionally, when the state (acting through social workers) approaches families with the assumption that the families have
strengths and abilities, there is a greater chance for collaboration
between the state and families, and less need for the social workers to
make decisions for families. The success of this approach is evident in
the reforms to Alabama's child welfare system that I describe below. 3 9
Finally, equality among families should be a goal of state support.
When the state limits conditions on low-income families receiving aid,
it furthers that goal. The state also furthers this goal by providing aid
in the first place. The provision of state support would enable lowincome families to enjoy an equality of decisionmaking opportunity
because much decisionmaking requires access to resources. The ability to make health care decisions has little meaning if the child has no
health insurance and the parent no means to pay for the care.
137 See Nestor M. Davidson, "HousingFirst"forthe Chronically Homeless: Challenges of
a New Service Model, 15 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING 125, 125, 127-28 (2006); Sam
Tsemberis et al., Housing First,Consumer Choice, and Harm Reduction for Homeless IndividuaLs with a DualDiagnosis,94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 651, 654-55 (2004). For a wonderful
anecdotal account of this program, see Malcolm Gladwell, Million-DollarMurray, NEW
YORKER, Feb. 13-20, 2006, at 96.
138 See Davidson, supra note 137, at 127-28 (noting that such programs cost far
less than the "cycle of shelters, hospitals, mental hospitals, and incarceration" and
describing positive outcomes for clients in the areas of mental health and substance
abuse); see also Gladwell, supra note 137, at 96 (describing the one million dollars
spent by the state on services, such as emergency room visits, needed by one individual, as opposed to the typical $15,000 annual cost of permanent housing plus supportive services).
139 See infra text accompanying notes 161-68.
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Equality Among Families

Article on the needs of
Although I have focused throughout this
I am not proposing a twolow-income families, let me be clear that
for economically stable families and one
tiered family autonomy, one
14 ° Rather, my proposal is for one version of
for low-income families.
economically stafamily autonomy for all families. It may be true that
"freedom from" vision of famble families are better able to enjoy the
for state support is not readily
ily autonomy because their need
is not conditioned on relinapparent or pathologized and therefore
But my argument is not that
quishing familial self-determination.
of family autonomy for such
there should be a "freedom from" vision
vision of family autonomy for lowfamilies and an "engagement with"
is that familial self-determinaincome families. Rather, my argument
and to reach this goal we
tion should be the goal of family autonomy,
relationship between families and
need to establish two tenets in the
the state.
The particular forms of supFirst, all families need state support.
needs, but all families benefit
port will vary depending on a family's
it comes from clear inheritance
from and need such support, whether
all families also need familial
rules or subsidized child care. Second,
system of
autonomy risks reinforcing the dual
140 A two-tiered version of family
families.
or at least sets apart, low-income
family law that traditionally disadvantages,
433-34
423,
REv.
L.
ParentalRights?, 35 STAN.
See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate
Professor
law).
family
public
between private and
(1983) (describing the distinction
that
Garrison notes
of
to parental rights. The doctrine
public family law has seldom deferred
property
common law inheritance and
parental rights descends instead from
private disputes, and it has largely
resolve
to
concepts which developed
a parent and another private indiremained so confined. Thus, as between
parental rights to the cussuperior
vidual, courts have generally recognized
courts
under the family law of the poor,
tody and control of children, but
showany
without
custody to the state
have routinely ordered parents to cede
ing of fault.
at 329-47
Parenthood Divided, supra note 76,
Id. (footnotes omitted); Hasday,
the nineof
quarter
last
the
in
emerged
law that
(describing the dual system of family
of a
norm
families that did not fit the dominant
teenth century, which disadvantaged
further
and
paycheck
his
an entire family with
male breadwinner able to support
to protect chilintervention was widely justified
state
families,
arguing that for such
tenBroek, Calia harmful family situation); Jacobus
dren from what was perceived as
(pt. 1), 16
Status
Origin, Development, and Present
fornia's Dual System of Family Law: Its
law" and
family
"civil
(discussing distinction between
STAN. L. REv. 257, 262 (1964)
readily
state
the
families,
poor
noting that for
the "family law of the poor," while
intervened
state
the
families,
other
for
while
the
intervened between parent and child,
then only when private parties initiated
and
circumstances,
extreme
in
only
action).
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self-determination, which entails deference from the state regarding
parental decisionmaking. Currently, we do not explicitly condition
state support of economically stable families on those families foregoing a measure of familial self-determination. Therefore, we should
not do so for low-income families.
My proposal seeks to decouple state support from losses of selfdetermination. There will be one set of rules for all families. All families will receive state support as well as state deference to parental
decisionmaking (within the pre-set bounds that apply to all families;
no one is free to make decisions that result in child abuse or neglect).
C.

Three PromisingExamples

A reconceived family autonomy-one that continues to protect
family integrity and a diversity of parental decisionmaking but broadens the vision of state responsibility for supporting families-is a novel
idea in child welfare. There are, however, examples of programs in
the field that make a step in the right direction, demonstrating how
familial self-determination and state support need not be zero sum.
This subpart describes three such programs. My intent in this subpart
is not to explore in detail the programs that embrace this approach,
nor to endorse any particular program, but rather to note that it is
possible to move toward a reconceived family autonomy.14
First, the Nurse-Family Partnership program has been very successful in both preventing child abuse and neglect and serving the
needs of parents and children. In this program, a public health nurse
visits a low-income, first-time parent during pregnancy and the first
141 I also do not address potential criticisms of the three programs I describe,
including, for example, whether the success rates may, at least in part, be influenced

by selection bias. My intent is to begin a conversation about how we can better help
children by helping their families. Thus, for example, even if selection bias does
influence the success rates of these programs, such bias does not negate the help the

state has provided the families who participate on a voluntary basis. The point is that
the state can assist at least some families, and do so in a way that furthers familial selfdetermination. Further, there are a number of implementation questions about the
exact nature and manner of the support the state would make available to families
under the "engagement with" model of family autonomy that I propose. As I have
said repeatedly in this Article, preventing child abuse and neglect will entail some
combination of general antipoverty and targeted prevention programs. The exact
combination of such programs is not the subject of this Article. Rather, my goal is to

propose a conception of autonomy that will lead to a new relationship between the
state and families. Once we have begun to think differently about how the state can

interact with families, I and others can continue the conversation and address these
interesting and important implementation issues.
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142 The nurse works closely with the mother
two years of a child's life.
helps improve prenatal health.
on three main goals. First, the nurse
and health of the child by
Second, the nurse aids the development
care to the child. Third, the
helping parents provide more competent
stability by helping parents
nurse improves the family's economic
to staying in school and 14finding
3 The
develop and accomplish goals relating
pregnancies.
subsequent
plan
parents
helping
as
well
work, as
such as subaddresses poverty-related problems,
program specifically
1 44
stance abuse.
striking. Families receiving this
The results of the program are
rate of child
percent lower incidence
145 The program
kind of support have an eighty
situated families.
abuse and neglect than similarly
for parents, children, and the
benefits
also produces numerous other
14 7
The program
to be cost-effective.
state. 1 46 Moreover, it appears
148 as compared with the direct
costs approximately $8700 per family,

note 118, at 1.
Delinquency Prevention, supra
See Office of Juvenile Justice &
Justice &
118, at 1; see also Office of Juvenile
143 See G.AZNER ET AL., supra note
with ...
118, at 1 ("[Niurses work intensively
Delinquency Prevention, supra note
with
well-being
early childhood health, and
in
mothers to improve maternal, prenatal,
improvements
will help achieve long-term
the expectation that this intervention
the lives of at-risk families.").
note 118, at 1.
& Delinquency Prevention, supra
144 See Office of Juvenile Justice
this finding in
161; see also id. at 161-63 (discussing
145 See Olds, supra note 118, at
and neglect
abuse
child
in
that reductions
greater detail, and noting that evidence
end of the
the
following
up-tick
despite an initial
persisted over a fifteen-year period,
experience lower
participating families who did not
program, further finding that the
violence);
domestic
were those that also involved
the
rates of child abuse or neglect
(noting
1
at
118,
note
Prevention, supra
Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency
many benefits from such partnerships).
but to give
benefits of the program abound,
146 Studies documenting the positive
in the
involvement
of
rates
lower
had
visited homes
just one example, children in the
Visitation
Home
Olds et al., Long-Term Effects of Nurse
criminal justice system. See David
Controlled
Behavior: 15-Year Follow-up of a Randomized
on Children'sCriminal and Antisocial
Trial, 280 JAMA 1238, 1241 (1998).
the state
that a preventive approach will save
147 1 am not arguing definitively
ET AL.,
GLAZNER
e.g.,
See,
will.
to think it
money, although there are good reasons during the fifteen-year period following
that
supra note 118, at 11-19 (documenting
in governused, in 2001 dollars, $56,600 less
family
visited
average
the
intervention,
in a 393%
resulting
in taxes than a control group,
ment services and paid $8300 more
is to
intention
My
invested).
on the amount
recovery over the fifteen-year period
suggest
and
costs of the current system
point out the economic and noneconomic
human harm, to take a preventive
reduce
would
that it may save money, and certainly
approach to child welfare.
148 See id. at 16.
142

HeinOnline -- 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1532 2006-2007

2007)

MUTUAL

DEPENDENCY

IN

CHILD WELFARE

1533

system 149 and the noneconomic
and indirect costs of the child welfare
abuse and neglect. 50
harms associated with child
programs are known for helpSecond, early childhood education
cognitive and socioing children on a number of fronts, including
' 5 1 What is less known about these programs,
emotional development
with reduced rates of child
however, is that they also are associated
program involves the family and
abuse and neglect, at least when the 152
parents as well.
offers services to the

School District's Child-Parent
Thus, for example, the Chicago
education to children beginCenter (CPC) provides early childhood
at kindergarten or continuing
ning in preschool and either ending
-153 The program provides services to children,
until third grade
meals, and to parents, including
including health screening and free
1 54 The program
service agencies.
1 55
home visits and referrals to social
with different teachers.
classrooms
separate
in
also teaches parents
the rate of child abuse and neglect
A study of the program found that
was fifty-two percent lower
among children in the preschool program
15 6 The results were even better for
than the rate in the control group.
for at least four years. For
those children who stayed in the program
neglect rate was forty-eight perthese children, the child abuse and
in the program for one to four
cent lower than the rate for children
years. 157

program, there is evidence
Like the Nurse-Family Partnership
a child enrolled in the program for
that the CPC is cost-effective. For
$6692, including all the services
eighteen months, the program costs
in return to society by the time
to the family, and generates $47,759
billion
accompanying text (describing twenty-two
149 See supra notes 1, 24-25 and
costs).
indirect
ninety-four billion dollars in
dollars in direct costs and an estimated
system).
welfare
child
nonmonetary costs of the
150 See supra note 26 (describing
40, at xii-xvi.
note
supra
151 See KAROLY ET AL.,
and
L. Robertson, School-Based Early Intervention
Dylan
&
Reynolds
152 See ArthurJ.
19-20
3,
DEv.
Longitudinal Study, 74 CHILD
Later Child Maltreatment in the Chicago
(2003).
153 See id. at 8.
154 See id.
have their
supra note 3, at 14 ("The parents
155 See FIHT CreME: INVEST IN KIDS,
offers
and
visits
home
program also conducts
own teachers and classrooms. The
chiltheir
with
activities
other
or
in field trips
many opportunities for parents to join
child-raising
parents to learn and practice better
dren. All of this is aimed at helping
&
in their children's education."); Reynolds
skills and to get them actively involved
Robertson, supra note 152, at 8.
in the
Early Intervention and Child Well-Being
156 See A.J. Reynolds et al., School-Based
633, 643 (2003); Reynolds & Robertson,
Chicago LongitudinalStudy, 82 CHILD WELFARE
supra note 152, at 13-14.
note 152, at 14.
157 See Reynolds & Robertson, supra
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the child is twenty-one. 1 58 The return includes savings from lower
rates of special education enrollment and fewer arrests, coupled with
higher taxes paid by the students when they graduate high school. 159
The calculations do not account for any savings from reduced involvement in the child welfare system and preventive health care, and thus
could be much higher.
Such prevention programs should be the cornerstone of the child
welfare system. The dominant conception of family autonomy does
not present a legal barrier to such programs, but the existence of the
hands-off culture created by the conception indicates that these programs are marginalized in the world of child welfare rather than
viewed as essential components. These types of preventive programs
can and should be the very first attempt the state makes to support
families.
Moreover, these prevention programs do not sacrifice familial
self-determination. The state support strengthens families, thus lessening the likelihood that the family will become involved in the child
welfare system and that the parents will lose custody of the child.
Additionally, this kind of program is far less intrusive than the kind of
state involvement that may lie down the road for such families if they
become involved in the child welfare system. In these two programs,
participation is voluntary and the state plays a facilitative role by helping parents obtain what they want and need, not dictating certain
behavior or results. 160

A third promising example can be found in the reform of Alabama's child welfare system. Although not a prevention program per
se, Alabama has embraced a new approach to child welfare that
embodies the elements of my proposed reconception of family autonomy. There, parents brought a class-action lawsuit challenging the
state's child welfare practices because the state did not do enough to
help families or protect children from abuse or neglect. The parties
agreed to a settlement in 1991 that required Alabama to completely
reform its child welfare system. 6 1 The consent decree obligated the
158
159
160
effects

See Reynolds et al., supra note 156, at 645.
See id. at 644-45.
For a wonderful description of the experiences of a visiting nurse and the
on her clients, see Katherine Boo, Swamp Nurse, NEW YORKER, Feb. 6, 2006, at

54.
161

(1998);

See BAZELON
PAMELA

A.

CTR. FOR MENrAL

HEALTH LAW, MAKING

CHILD WELFARE WoRK 5

HOLCOMB ET AL., URBAN INST., RECENT CHANGES IN ALABAMA WEL-

13 (2001), available at
http://www.urban.org/uploadedPDF/310361-AL~update.pdf; Erik Eckhohm, Once
Woeful, Alabama Is Model in Child Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2005, at Al.
FARE AND WoRK, CHILD CARE, AND CHILD WELFARE Svs-rEMs
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state to provide services based on the strengths of children and par62
ents and to work to preserve families whenever possible.1
In reforming its system, Alabama has focused on two important
changes. It has more than doubled funding for services aimed to
keep families together. 6-3 The additional funds enable social workers
to provide individualized treatment plans and also offer previously
unavailable services. 1 64 Further, Alabama has worked to change the
views of the social workers, who were used to perceiving deficits, not
strengths, in biological families.1 65 This shift in attitudes was aided by
a change of leadership. The Commissioner of the Department of
Human Resources at the time of the consent decree opposed the settlement because she was concerned it would keep children in dangerous homes.' 66 By contrast, her successor embraced the goals of the
consent decree.' 67 The approach has been succeeding, with children
68
returned to biological parents and remaining safe in those homes'
Working more closely with families to promote family preservation and reunification embodies elements of a reconceived family
autonomy. It recognizes that both the state and families have important but distinct roles to play in addressing the problems underlying
the abuse or neglect. The approach does not subscribe to the view
that parents must simply pull themselves up by their bootstraps and be
162 See lBAZELON CTR., supra, note 16l, at 51. New York City has made similar
changes, moving toward a model that recognizes the strengths of biological families
and working with families in an attempt to preserve them. This change is happening
on a policy level, reducing by half the number of children in foster care, and statistics
appear to support the conclusion that this shift has not compromised the safety of
those children not placed in foster care. See Leslie Kaufman, Debate Rekindled on Pressuring Families at Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2006, at Al [hereinafter Kaufman, Debate];
Fernanda Santos, Placements in Foster CareAre at Lowest Since Mid-80's, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 2005, at A33. City officials attribute the reduction to a strong economy, a decline
in the use of crack cocaine, and an explicit policy adopted by the Administration for
Children's Services (ACS) that strives to keep children in their own families. See id.
The city offers substantial supports to parents, such as counseling, housing aid, and
substance abuse treatment. See id. This shift came under fire following a series of
high-profile fatalities among children known to the ACS. See Leslie Kaufman, Baby
Drowned as Mother Listened to CD's, ProsecutorSays, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2005, at BI; Kaufman, Debate, supra; Leslie Kaufman, Mother of Boy Who Died Was Trained, Agency Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2005, at 133; Leslie Kaufman & Jim Rutenberg, Agency Suspends
Supervisors After Girl's Death, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2006, at Al.
163 See HOLCOMB ET AL., supra note 161, at 14.
164 Id.
165 See BAZELON GTR., supra note 161, at 51.
166

See HOLCOMa ET AL., supra note 161, at 13.

167
168

See id.
See Eckholm, supra note 161.
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better parents. Rather, it acknowledges that there are serious
problems in the lives of many families and that these problems must
be addressed in order for children safely to remain with or return to
their biological families. Importantly, it recognizes that state assistance in this effort is essential, but that social workers must work with
families and rely on their strengths to accomplish the stated goals.
All three programs demonstrate both that it is possible to help
children by supporting parents and that this does not inevitably erode
familial self-determination. It might be suggested that my proposal
will work only in countries with a tradition of strong social welfare
programs. My argument is not that we should radically change our
culture, but rather that we should make choices cognizant of their
repercussions. A post hoc child welfare system that does not serve the
interests of parents, children, or the state is inevitable if we continue
to take a hands-off approach to the support of families. Supporting
families need not contradict the American tradition of familial selfdetermination-as demonstrated by the programs described abovebut the support itself is necessary if we want to reduce child abuse and
neglect, keep families together, and prepare the next generation of
citizens.
CONCLUSION

A prevention-oriented approach to child welfare consisting of
general antipoverty efforts and particularly emphasizing more
targeted prevention programs would be far more effective than the
current post hoc approach. But the dominant conception of family
autonomy-freedom from state control-poses a formidable conceptual barrier to the creation of a system that seeks principally to prevent child abuse and neglect, rather than simply respond to crises. I
have proposed a reconception of family autonomy that would foster
an environment in which a prevention-oriented approach could take
root. This conception encourages engagement with the state, not simply freedom from it. It is rooted in the mutual dependency of the
state and families in building the capacity, or more basically, the competency of the next generation. But state support should not, and
need not, come at the price of familial self-determination. The partnership I have proposed between families and the state holds tremendous promise to address the serious failings of the current child
welfare system. It also holds the promise of greater equality among
families by acknowledging that all families need state support and all
families need self-determination.
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